



# **THE EFFORT TO ACCOUNT FOR U.S. SERVICEMEN MISSING FROM THE KOREAN WAR**

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## Foreword

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**T**he Korean War ended with an armistice, signed 27 July 1953. More than 8,100 servicemen are unaccounted-for from that war, men who were killed in action, died as POWs, or were missing in action and presumed dead. Although the Korean War is popularly known as the Forgotten War, the U.S. government has not forgotten those missing men. The search for answers on the unaccounted-for servicemen started before the 1953 ceasefire and goes on today. The all-important effort to obtain cooperation from our Korean War era adversaries has achieved remarkable results in recent years.

This report highlights those government efforts to achieve full accounting of the Korean War losses since the end of that conflict. The dedicated effort of the United Nations Command to get an accounting of the missing from the Communists can be traced back to the first Truce Tent meetings in 1951; their work paid off with the 1953 and 1954 prisoner and remains exchanges and later in the return

of remains from North Korea in the 1990s. Bringing the most recent promise for the accounting of our missing men may be the current joint U.S./Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) effort to conduct searches in formerly closed areas of North Korea. Also, the continued access to Russian Air Force archives by the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs is shedding light after 50 years on the fate of many of our aviators lost over North Korea. Our remains identification facilities and supporting laboratories are working hard to push the full accounting effort forward. The report recognizes both their effort and the contributions of the staffs of the military service casualty offices, which are succeeding in locating families of the lost servicemen after nearly 50 years.



*American POWs captured summer 1950*

On 27 July 1995 at the National Korean War Memorial dedication, President Clinton, speaking about the MIAs, made our goals clear: **"...we have not forgotten our debt to them and we will never stop working for the day when they can be brought home."** We are honored to produce this report as a means to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Korean War, and we hope the report will help inform those concerned on the totality of the U.S. government effort to find answers on those still missing from that conflict. This report is also available on the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) web site at <http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo>.

  
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## Introduction

On 11 November 1999, at the Arlington National Cemetery Memorial Service, President Clinton delivered his Veterans Day address. Standing by were members of Congress, cabinet principals and undersecretaries, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), leaders and soldiers from veteran service organizations, and foreign dignitaries representing countries that had stood with the United States in overseas conflicts. During his remarks the president mentioned the sacrifices made by the prisoners of war this past century and the need to continue our efforts to locate those missing: **"I am proud to announce today that we have successfully recovered the remains of three more United States servicemen lost during the Korean War. They're coming home tonight. But we must not waver in our common efforts to make the fullest possible accounting for all our MIAs, for all their families to have their questions answered."**

The repatriation of these three men took place at Sunan Airport in North Pyongyang, DPRK. The U.S. government official accepting the remains was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War (POW)/Missing Personnel Affairs, Robert L. Jones. Military honors were provided by an honor guard from the United Nations Command. The remains were evacuated through Japan to Hawaii in a U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command C-17 cargo aircraft. The recovery was conducted by a combined U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI) and Korean Peoples Army (KPA) search and recovery team, which had been investigating locations along the Chongchon River in North Korea where U.S. servicemen had been missing

since November 1950. This remains recovery was not a first-time event—in fact, it was the 12th such operation in four years.

This report recounts the extraordinary effort involved in attaining agreement between two countries still technically at war to search for missing U.S. servicemen. It also highlights other initiatives of the U.S. government effort to get answers on our missing service members from the Korean War. The nearly 50-year endeavor to get an accounting of more than 8,100 servicemen lost in that war has often met with frustration, but not for the lack of all possible effort. Beyond the early successes from the prisoner exchanges, Operations Big and Little Switch, and the remains recoveries from Operation Glory, not much progress was made.



***United Nations honor guard and U.S. veterans render honors to repatriated remains from North Korea***

The U.S. government was, and continues to be to a significant extent, constrained by the Cold War realities and the regional security problems of the 1950s through the early 1990s. Even so, through consistent exertion by the United Nations Command, and with the support of members of Congress, the U.S.

government was able to receive from the North Koreans more than 200 sets of remains in the early 1990s.

In recent years even more remarkable successes have been achieved in obtaining cooperation from our Korean War adversaries, particularly the North Koreans and the Russians. U.S. Army CILHI and DPMO teams since 1996 have spent up to six months a year in North Korea conducting battlefield search and recovery operations and archival research missions; they have been backed by a small logistics coordination element out of Beijing for the same length of time. From this endeavor, over 90 sets of remains have been recovered.

This report also mentions the cooperation by the Russian Federation, which has passed to the Department of Defense (DoD) more than 14,000 relevant pages from archival sources. In addition, Russian officials have allowed U.S. researchers regular access to the Russian Air Force archives from the Korean War, files that are rich in descriptions of U.S. aircraft shootdown incidents.

While China has remained cautious about U.S. government engagement on POW/MIA matters related to the Korean War, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs has taken on dozens of specific cases of U.S. Korean War losses for research. Moreover, it has begun to make available its veterans for oral history interviews and is expected soon to allow for academic exchanges. DPMO, in its own oral history and archival research programs, has

interviewed more than 1,500 veterans and sifted through thousands of feet of file space contained in archives worldwide. From this effort, researchers have generated leads on what happened to many hundreds of the Korean War missing.

Our Republic of Korea (ROK) allies have entered into a cooperative effort with DoD to share data from their research and remains recovery effort in South Korea on their own losses. This three-year initiative has begun with the excavation of sites from the early battles between the ROK Army and the KPA near Seoul and Taegu.

Advances in science since the mid-1980s have allowed the U.S. Army CILHI to begin reexamining the remains of unknown Korean War servicemen buried in the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii. The families of the missing are full partners in the endeavor, thanks to an outreach program being conducted by DPMO and the



***Remains repatriation from the first JRO at the Panmunjom Joint Security Area***



services aimed at locating these next of kin. Already 1,686 next-of-kin samples of the rapidly expanding mitochondrial DNA database are on file at the Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory. This database is also being used to aid in the identification of the remains returned from the current joint U.S./DPRK search and recovery program.

Despite recent progress, challenges ahead remain daunting. DoD policymakers will continue to press the North Koreans for assistance in resolving reports of postwar live sightings of Americans in that country. It is a further goal of DoD to continue the dialogue

with the DPRK to gain access to unsurveyed prison camp and UN registered cemeteries in North Korea. Investigations in Russia will continue as well, in an effort to determine if transfers of servicemen to the Soviet Union took place during the Korean War. In the archival research realm, thousands of linear feet of file space in more than 300 records repositories located worldwide are still awaiting review and indexing for leads on our MIAs. DoD researchers will continue to aggressively pursue any information from any avenue that will assist the U.S. government in these POW/MIA accounting endeavors.



## Chapter 1: Post-Armistice Accounting Effort

In June 1951, UN and Communist forces were entrenched in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that now separates the Koreas; the Korean War had begun its second year and was at a stalemate. Prospects for a peaceful resolution to the conflict emerged following a statement made on 1 June by United Nations Secretary General Trygve Lie, who called for a cease-fire along the 38th Parallel. Also at that time, the U.S. Department of State made overtures to the Soviets asking them to approach the Chinese about a cease-fire. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko responded by suggesting that a military armistice could be concluded between the military powers, ignoring larger political and territorial matters.

Encouraged by the Soviet position, the JCS, in coordination with the Department of State, instructed General Mathew Ridgway, Commander of the UN Command (UNC), to broadcast a radio message to the commander in chief of Communist forces in Korea. Ridgway's 30 June message called for a meeting to discuss a cease-fire and a mechanism to maintain the armistice. This signal was answered a day later by the Communists, who were willing to begin cease-fire discussions in Kaesong. An 8 July meeting of UN and Communist liaison officers took place at this neutral site, and they arranged for the first negotiation session between Admiral C. Turner Joy and General Nam Il, the selected heads of delegation for the opposing sides.

Admiral Joy took his guidance from General Ridgway and General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the JCS. The Secretaries of Defense and State (George Marshall and Dean Acheson) and the JCS developed the White House-approved negotiating parameters for him. At the first meeting on 10 July, Admiral Joy presented a nine-point agenda to General Nam. The agenda included a

call for cessation of hostilities, a truce line, the make-up of observer teams, the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in prison camp inspections, and the return of prisoners of war. After three more weeks of meetings involving proposals and counterproposals on the substance of the agenda, the opposing sides came to an agreement, which included the prisoner of war handling issue.

The UN and Communist sides developed a framework for the prisoner exchanges in a series of meetings in Kaesong between December 1951 and March 1952. One of the few agreements reached in these meetings involved the 18 December 1951 exchange of prisoner lists; accordingly, the Communists passed a list of 3,198 Americans whom they claimed were in their custody at that time. Intense study of this early list by the U.S. Forces Far East Command became, in part, the basis for postwar discussions with the Communists on men who did not return.



*Kaesong house where negotiations took place*

## **Operations Little Switch and Big Switch**

The Truce Tent discussions on the disposition of POWs were highly contentious. Throughout 1952 and much of 1953, the key issue that held up progress on the prisoner exchanges was the Communists' refusal to allow for voluntary nonrepatriations of prisoners. The UN side postulated that the Communists would be afraid of a propaganda defeat from massive defections from the compounds holding enemy POWs. A UN poll of Communist prisoners in April 1952 indicated only about 70,000 of the 170,000 prisoners and civilian internees wished to return to Communist custody.

It was not until March 1953 that substantial headway was made on the POW exchange issue, when the Communist side unexpectedly agreed on 28 March 1953 to an ICRC and



*American POWs learn of impending repatriation*



*American POW arrives at the prisoner exchange point, Panmunjom*

Commander, UNC-proposed exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. The exchange, Operation Little Switch, took place from 20 April to 3 May 1953. One hundred forty-nine Americans, of a total of 684 UN prisoners, were released. These men were flown immediately to hospitals in Tokyo and San Francisco for recuperation. During debriefings, repatriated prisoners from Operation Little Switch reported that not all of the sick and wounded prisoners eligible for release were exchanged by the Communists. This reporting




prompted Rear Admiral John C. Daniel, then the senior UNC liaison member, to lodge a protest at a May 1953 meeting in Panmunjom, accusing the Communists of withholding more than 300 sick and wounded men from exchange.

The breakthrough that resulted in the exchange of the balance of the prisoners was the Communist side's ultimate concession to the UN position favoring the voluntary nonrepatriations of prisoners. Both sides had argued for months on all details concerning the handling of those prisoners desiring not to be repatriated; chief among the disputes was the nomination of the neutral countries that would handle them and the location and the length of custody at the neutral site before final disposition. Agreement was reached on the handling of the voluntary nonrepatriates in June of 1953; further, language was worked out in the Armistice Agreement that all prisoners would be released within 60 days of the signing of the armistice. Accordingly, with the 27 July 1953 signing, a total of 3,597 Americans were released along with 1,384 UN prisoners and 7,862 Republic of Korea (ROK) soldiers at the new truce village, Panmunjom, between 5 August and 5 September 1953. The sick and wounded held back from Operation Little Switch were among those released in this second phase. U.S. returnees from Operation Big Switch were trucked or taken by helicopter from Panmunjom to Inchon, and from there, nine transport ships took them to San Francisco for eventual release to units and families.

## UN Requests for POW Accounting

As stated earlier, the United Nations received a list of 3,198 American prisoners and another 9,000 UN and ROK prisoners that the Communist side admitted holding on 18 December 1951. Thirty-two men were reported dead by the Communists, 23 chose to defect (two of whom reversed their decision in the POW exchange process), and two were unaccounted for. The rest came back in the prisoner exchanges. Nevertheless, the UN side believed that the Communists should have been able to account for many more missing and suspected prisoners. The Far East Command, working with the military services, developed lists of individuals for whom there was some evidence that the Communists should know of their fate.

The overall program name for the effort to obtain information on detained personnel from the Korean War was the Returned or Exchanged Captured American Personnel-Korea program or "RECAP-K." The POW returnees played a huge role in this endeavor. They received a four-phased debriefing program consisting of (1) biographical summary of the individual, (2) counterintelligence—consisting of questions to determine the degree, if any, to which the prisoner might have succumbed to Communist indoctrination, (3) general military intelligence on enemy



*Far East Command Document,  
"A Study in Repatriation"*

facilities, equipment, and order of battle, and (4) questions on those who did not return and questions of regional interest not covered in other phases.

To administer the POW interview process, the U.S. Army organized multiservice interview teams, called Joint Intelligence Processing Teams, which were deployed on each of the ships transporting the repatriated POWs. The teams included trained interrogators and psychiatrists and members of the Judge Advocate General's Corps. The Far East Command created special forms to aid in the interview process: Army Forces Far East Form 545, used to identify prisoners the returnees believed had died, and Form 546, used to identify prisoners believed to be alive.

Apart from the POW returnee questionnaire data, the Far East Command personnel and intelligence staffs reviewed other information, including command reports, wartime letters written home by prisoners, intelligence reports, ICRC reports, propaganda broadcasts, and domestic and foreign press articles, including Communist publications such as *Shanghai News* and the *National Guardian*, for any mention of prisoners. From this review the Far East Command intelligence staff produced a report, "A Study in Repatriation," in September 1953, which included lists of known or suspected prisoners. On 9 September 1953, shortly before the study's completion, the UN presented the Communists a list of 3,404 (including 944 American) names of missing persons characterized at the time as POWs and asked the Communists for an accounting.

The Communists did not provide an immediate satisfactory answer concerning this list, but did make known to the Indian led body administering the POW repatriations, the Neutral Nations Repatriations Commission, that 23 of the men were refusing repatriation. Two of these 23 reversed their decisions during the prisoner exchange process. Later during Operation Glory, the Communists returned the remains of some of the men on the list. In May and August of 1955 they returned 15 aviators allegedly captured after being shot down over China airspace. The Communists also responded to a 26 November 1955 update of the list, resulting in a UN reduction of more than 1,000 names. POW repatriates themselves mentioned the death of some of these men in the prison camps.

The Department of Defense (DoD) revealed in 1957 that the list of 944 was not actually a list of unrepatriated prisoners, but in fact a list of missing men about whom the Communists should have known something. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) Stephen S. Jackson (Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve Affairs) testified before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Far East and Pacific and stated,

*Shortly after the official exchange of POWs had been completed in September 1953, officials of the UN Command handed the Communist side a list of 3,404 names of missing UN Command personnel including the names of 944 United States servicemen of whom we had reason to believe the Communists should have some knowledge. At the outset I should like to make clear that in placing this demand for an accounting on the Communists, the UN Command did not intend to imply that we were charging the Communists with holding this large group of Americans alive and against their will.*

The services continued to search for information on the fates of men on this U.S. list of 944 into the 1960s. The Air Force project name for their effort was "Project American," from which Manual, FM 200-25 was produced in 1961, describing the circumstances of loss of each of its men on the list. By 1954 the U.S. list stood at 526, by 1957, 450, and by 1962, 389. When the list stood at 450,

the U.S. Congress expressed its desire for the accounting of these men in a joint resolution sponsored by Rep. Clement Zablocki (WI) of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The resolution stated in part, "...let it be Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that the President, through his own offices, and those of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, should make the return of the four hundred and fifty American prisoners of war still imprisoned by the Communist forces the foremost objective of the foreign policy of the United States."

Since the signing of the Armistice Agreement, the UNC has passed the list to the Communist side no fewer than 31 times with a request for an accounting. The reductions came largely through the investigative and graves registration efforts of the services and not through the aid of the North Koreans or Chinese. Some of the men on the list were actually recovered by U.S. graves registration teams operating in the UNC-controlled side of the DMZ following the war.

## **Policy and Direction on POW Accounting**

The POW accounting issue was of interest at the highest levels of the U.S. government. As mentioned earlier, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS provided White House-approved guidance to the UNC on negotiating with the Communists at Panmunjom. President Eisenhower in 1954 sent personal telegrams to the families of known POWs held in China, stating that the U.S. government would take the necessary steps to secure the release of these men. His Operations Coordinating Board, an interagency panel made up of representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the U.S. Information Agency, met periodically in the mid-1950s to coordinate positions for U.S. diplomats dealing with the Communists. Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson formed an Advisory Committee on POWs in the summer of 1955 to develop policy recommendations on various aspects of the POW issue including code of conduct, military justice, and strategies for approaching the Communists on POW accounting.

## **Efforts through Geneva**

While the UNC was the principal communications link to the Communists on POW/MIA issues, the U.S. government also used the ICRC in Geneva. As early as 1950, the Far East Command and the services developed lists of missing men with requests for information on their status for passing through Red Cross channels. Later requests included men on the list of 944. In addition, the Far East Command used the channel to protest to the Chinese for moving select small groups of POWs (who were ultimately repatriated) from the main camps at Pyoktong, Wiwon and Changsong, North Korea, across the Yalu River for overnight stays in Dandong, China, for interrogation. These returnees described being interrogated by Chinese and Russian personnel about aircraft characteristics, capabilities, and unit order of battle.

In 1954, also in Geneva, at the suggestion of the Chinese, Ambassador Alexis Johnson conducted a series of meetings with representatives of the Chinese Consulate. These meetings led to the May and August 1955 release of 15 aviators alleged to have been shot down over China during the war. One Canadian aviator held in China preceded these handovers in 1954. Six months prior to

the release of the first group of Americans, the American consul general had protested to the Chinese concerning their government's military court martial conviction of these aviators on charges of spying.

## **Operation Glory**

During the Korean War thousands of U.S servicemen men were killed or died as prisoners on the territory of North Korea. The locations of prison camp and UN registered cemeteries and isolated burials were known to the UN side of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), the combined UN and Communist body charged with administering the Armistice Agreement. The Armistice Agreement included a provision for the recovery of these men and those of the Communist side on South Korean territory. At the 47th meeting of the MAC on 17 August 1954, the final arrangements for exchange of remains of missing servicemen on the territory of the DPRK and the ROK were made. The specific language from the Armistice Agreement, paragraph 13f, read,

*In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves registration personnel of the other side to enter, within a definite time limit after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the territory under their control, for the purpose of proceeding to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. The specific procedures and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall be determined by the MAC. The commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other side all available information pertaining to the places of burial of the deceased military personnel of the other side.*

The 17 August 1954 "Understanding on Administrative Details for Delivery and Reception of Bodies of Military Personnel of Both Sides" permitted only the exchange of remains and not the provision of the cross-border operations by graves registration teams. There was concern at the UNC that the Communist side would use the provision as a cover for reconnaissance missions. Both sides had previously agreed to allow for recovery of losses in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which took place from 12 August 1953 to 21 November 1953. For those operations both the UN and Communist sides cleared lanes through mine fields and conducted recovery operations in their own side of the DMZ, the four kilometer-wide strip of territory on either side of the 240 kilometer Military Demarcation Line. Six MAC observer teams supervised the DMZ recoveries. In those operations, U.S. graves registration teams recovered 253 sets of remains.

Operation Glory began 1 September 1954 and lasted two months. The Korea Communications Zone Graves Registration Division was responsible for the recovery of North Korean and Chinese dead and returned 14,000 sets of remains. The two available quartermaster companies processed both inbound U.S. dead and outbound Korean People's Army/Chinese People's Volunteers (KPA/CPV) dead; they were augmented by two ROK graves registration companies. The division accepted 4,023 UN dead including 2,944 Americans. UN remains were transported by Russian trucks under joint North Korean and Chinese guard jeeps to Panmunjom



and met there by UN escort jeeps carrying flags emblazoned with the words *Operation Glory* on a white background. At the Munsan-ni railhead, just south of Panmunjom, each U.S., UN, or ROK set of remains received was assigned an N-Evacuation Number (a unique registration and inventory number) — the first step in the identification process.

All identification media and personal effects were to be delivered with the remains. The remains were then sent by train to Pusan in southeast ROK, following a memorial ceremony in Seoul. From Pusan they went by ship to the Port of Moji in Japan. At the Central Identification Unit in Kokura, the U.S. war dead were identified prior to their return to the United States. The 421 unidentifiable service members were buried in the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific, known as “the Punchbowl,” beginning with a shipment aboard the U.S.S. *Manchester* out of the Port of Yokahama, 21 January 1954. The first identified Operation Glory returns left port on 16 October 1954 on the *U.S.N.S.E.D. Patrick*, bound for the United States.

Although Operation Glory had a specified end date of 31 October 1954, a provision for the return of any new remains discoveries was retained from the 17 August 1954 Understanding on repatriations, paragraph 20. It read, “In the event that either side discovers in its territory bodies of military personnel belonging to the other side after the termination of this understanding, the delivery and reception of such bodies shall be arranged through the Secretaries of both sides of the MAC.”

## **Operations in South Korea**

From 1951 to 1956 U.S. Eighth Army graves registration teams conducted search and recovery operations in the southern part of the peninsula in search of U.S. dead. U.S. Army Graves Registration Services teamed with the U.S. Eighth Army Historian to develop field search cases for every combat engagement in which U.S.

servicemen were still missing from the initial ground battle at Osan (Task Force Smith--1/21 Infantry and A/52nd Field Artillery, 5 July 1950, Field Search Case 001F). The teams worked with the Korean Police, local officials, and schools to publicize the search effort and systematically combed each 1,000-square-meter grid where missing U.S. servicemen were last seen. Between division and Eighth Army Mortuary operations, 25,000 U.S. dead from battlefields and temporary cemeteries in the south were sent to Kokura to be identified along with those from Operation Glory.

The Central Identification Unit (which also processed the Operation Glory remains returns) opened in January 1951 in Kokura to accept remains from UN cemeteries. With the death from a military motor vehicle mishap and evacuation of the remains of U.S. Eighth Army Commander General Walton Walker to the United States, a precedent and policy was established to evacuate all U.S. dead out of Korea.

The last shipment of remains from the Korean War left Port Moji on 1 February 1956 aboard the *USS Marine Adler*, and the Kokura facility was closed shortly thereafter. The effort in the south did not end in 1956, however. Over the years numerous remains discoveries have been reported by farmers, local police, and even U.S. and ROK military forces. The U.S. Eighth Army Mortuary and Historian's offices teamed up with the U.S. Army CILHI to investigate and recover remains in response to such reports. This effort resulted in remains recoveries in 1982, 1987, 1989, 1995, and each year from 1997 to 2000. Recoveries in 1982 and 1987 led to identifications of two U.S. soldiers missing since the North Koreans push toward the Pusan Perimeter in the summer of 1950. Upon analysis at CILHI, the other recoveries were determined not to be those of missing U.S. soldiers.

While most recoveries in the aforementioned time frame resulted from individual discoveries, deliberate battlefield excavations were conducted in 1986, 1987, and 1999 in South Korea in sites from the battles of Chipyeong Ni, Obong Ni, and Horseshoe Ridge,

which had all taken place in 1951 east of Seoul in the north central area of South Korea. This effort involved systematically clearing dozens of wartime fighting positions from the battle sites. All recoveries from these battlefields were determined to be Chinese and North Korean mongoloid remains not found during Operation Glory.

### **Breakthroughs in the 1990s**

Regrettably, little progress was made on the POW/MIA issue with the DPRK between 1954 and 1990. The defense of South Korea was a paramount security concern to the United States. Cross-DMZ attacks and acts of terrorism inside and outside of the Korean peninsula were a constant problem. Tragic reminders of these were the seizure of the *U.S.S. Pueblo* and crew in January 1968 with the loss of one man, the April 1969 shootdown of a U.S. Navy EC-121 in the Sea of Japan with the loss of 31 crew, and the August 1976 ax murders of two U.S. Army officers at Panmunjom. More than 70 U.S. servicemen and 300 ROK military lost their lives as a result of hostile action by the North Koreans between 1955 and 1994.

Notwithstanding the acute postwar tensions on the peninsula, the UNC continued to appeal to the Communist side for both an accounting of MIAs and the return of remains in this period. Between 1956 and 1985 on a near annual basis, the UNC surfaced as an agenda item, a request for the accounting of 2,233 UN losses, including 389 Americans. In December 1982 the UNC senior member requested that the KPA/CPV conduct a search of the burial sites at UNC POW Camp Number 5 at Pyoktong for possible remains. With the request was a map depicting the sites. The KPA ignored the request at that time as well as three others in August of 1983, 1984, and 1985.

In September 1985 a KPA representative to the MAC told an American United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) officer that the DPRK leadership would respond positively to a proposal for the return of U.S. remains. Then in October 1985, during a visit to the UN, DPRK Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam met in New York with Frank Kerr, then president of the Chosin Few, a U.S. veterans organization made up of survivors of the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir. In the meeting Nam mentioned the DPRK would be willing to discuss repatriation of U.S. servicemen's remains directly with the U.S. government. The U.S. government, in deference to the ROK government, responded in December 1985 that the remains returns should be handled multinationally with the MAC. The ROK government's position on this issue was clear, as Foreign Minister Lee Han Key informed the U.S. ambassador to the ROK that the United States should not meet with the DPRK without ROK participation under any circumstances.

The timing of these overtures suggested that the DPRK may have wanted to use the POW/MIA issue as a wedge to marginalize the ROK, which they considered a puppet government of the United States. To counter this position, the UNC continued to argue for remains recovery participation by all UNC members during the winter of 1985. It began collecting data on men still missing from UN member nations in preparation for conducting remains recovery operations in North Korea of both U.S. and UN losses. In August 1986 the UNC again passed to the Communist side information on grave sites in North Korea. The North Koreans held their ground, continuing to express their desire to keep discussions at the U.S. and DPRK governmental level, and proposed the establishment of U.S./DPRK bilateral search parties to conduct recovery operations.

In October 1987, on behalf of the DPRK, the Soviet embassy in Washington relayed a letter to U.S. Representative Steven Solarz (NY) and Senator Alan Cranston (CA) that proposed a meeting be organized between U.S. and DPRK parliamentarians. While such a meeting did not take place, an arrangement was made through the Department of State and the UNC that the DPRK would return five sets of remains to a U.S. congressional delegation headed by U.S. Representative Frank McCloskey (IN). A terror incident perpetrated by the DPRK in January 1988 (the bombing of Korean Air Lines Flight 858) precluded an exchange at that time.

### **North Korea Returns Remains**

The two sides came closer to a remains exchange in 1989, although the North continued to attach conditions, namely, the lifting of sanctions and the removal of the DPRK from the U.S. Department of State's "State Sponsor of Terrorism" list. By November 1989, the North Korean position softened when the DPRK UN observer Ho Jong suggested remains could be returned if a congressional delegation came to Pyongyang. The Chairman of the House Veterans Affairs Committee, Sonny Montgomery (GA), held a meeting in New York with Ho to discuss the North Korean proposal. Montgomery acted affirmatively and formed a congressional delegation that visited Pyongyang. The protocols for the return of the remains were arranged between the KPA and the UNC in three days of meetings, 15–17 May 1990. On 28 May 1990, with Congressman Montgomery presiding, the North Koreans returned five sets of remains. UNCMAC received the remains from the KPA at Panmunjom and a UNC Honor Guard provided full military honors. This was the first transfer of Korean War U.S. remains in 36 years from the DPRK. The remains were then sent to CILHI for identification.

Other members of Congress made overtures to help build momentum for this nascent initiative, including Senators Phil Gramm (TX), John McCain (AZ), and Robert Smith (NH). Senator Smith traveled to Pyongyang in June 1991 to meet with the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kang Sok Ju, and observed the handover of 11 sets of remains from the KPA to UNCMAC at Panmunjom on 24 June 1991. He met with Kang again in September 1991 in New York to suggest that a Department of State-proposed multilateral commission be established. The commission would have Korea-based MAC membership, although it would technically be outside of the MAC. Heretofore the North Koreans had rejected such a body, insisting that only a U.S./DPRK bilateral mechanism would be supportable. Kang was cordial but noncommittal to the proposal. Kang did offer to get some information on the status of nonrepatriated Korean War POWs, which Smith had asked about during the first meeting.

In November 1991, the U.S. political counselor in Beijing met with his DPRK counterpart, Pak Sok Gyun. In that meeting the North Koreans reiterated their position that the remains recovery effort should be bilateral, not multilateral as was suggested by the United States. Pak also stated twice that there "was not a single POW alive in the DPRK," an apparent response to the Senator Smith's requests from June.

Four months later at Panmunjom, North Korean military officers with the MAC told UNCMAC counterparts that the DPRK was prepared to return 30 additional sets of U.S. remains. A remains return protocol meeting was held 19 April 1992 by the MAC Secretaries at Panmunjom, and the remains were turned over on 13 May and 28 May 1992 in two groups of 15. Significantly, there was no condition attached to the return of the remains. The ceremonies were conducted by the UNCMAC with participation of personnel from the ROK.

## Research and Investigative Effort Involving the Former USSR

In December 1991 Russian President Boris Yeltsin met with Senators John Kerry and Robert Smith, Co-Chairmen of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIAs, during a U.S.-Russia summit in Washington, DC. In that meeting he suggested that the two countries form a joint commission to investigate the loss of American service members on or adjacent to Soviet territory, or in Soviet control, from 1945 to 1991. Also during this visit, Yeltsin stated that U.S. POWs had been transferred to the Soviet Union.

The Yeltsin statement generated predictable interest by the U.S. government. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Directorate for East Asia and the Pacific Region engaged the RAND Corporation to conduct a study to determine whether any American POWs were being held against their will in the former USSR. Researchers with RAND and subsequently with Defense Forecasts International traveled to archives in the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and the Baltic states in search of information on Americans potentially held against their will. The study was also responsive to congressional legislation, Public Law 102-183, Section 406, calling for DoD to report on efforts to resolve cases of persons classified as missing since World War II and Korea. RAND's finding on the extent of prisoner transfers to the Soviet Union, published in 1994, suggested a small number of unnamed Americans, possibly around 50, were taken to the former Soviet Union during the Korean War.




**USRJC Plenum**

A significant result of the Yeltsin summit was the formation of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs (USRJC) in early 1992, created as a bilateral mechanism for investigating matters concerning the presence of American servicemen on the territory of the former Soviet Union. On the American side, there were representatives from the legislative branch (Senators Kerry and Smith, Representatives Douglas B. Peterson and Jon Miller, former POWs) and the executive branch (State, Defense, Intelligence, and Archives), under the chairmanship of former Ambassador to the USSR Malcolm Toon.

The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel organized Task Force Russia, a 40-person investigative arm, to support the U.S. side of the commission, with offices in Moscow and Washington. The Russian side of the commission, headed by General Colonel Dmitri Volkogonov, included members from the Russian archives, Federal Security Service, and the Russian Presidential Commission on POWs, Internees, and Missing in Action.

foreign policy, and intelligence officials. In television and radio appearances, Mr. Toon made appeals to citizens who might have knowledge on American POW/MIAs. The Russians allowed U.S. investigators to interview Soviet veterans from the Korean War (and the Cold War and the Vietnam War) but did not authorize access to archives deemed key by the U.S. side for determining whether Americans had been sent to the USSR.



***"Agreement on Remains-related Matters"***

The USRJC held quarterly plenary sessions in Moscow and also visited the capitals of many of the states of the former USSR and Prague, meeting political leaders and top defense,

Research by the U.S. side found several Soviet archival documents that recorded discussions on the POW situation and the cease-fire agreement. The notion of withholding

prisoners was an item of discussion. Stalin had a concern that UN-held Chinese POWs would be released to Chaing Kai Shek instead of being returned to the People's Republic of China; he proposed to Chou En Lai in a meeting in 1952 that if the Americans did not return all Communist POWs, then the North Koreans and Chinese should hold back the same percentage until the issue was decided.

Following a year and a half of investigation, the U.S. side of the commission published a 77-page report, "The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union." The primary goal of the report was to show the Russians that a body of information existed suggesting that the Soviets had taken Americans to the Soviet Union. While that information was circumstantial, the report caused the Russians to publicly admit that the possibility of the transfers could not be dismissed, a notion heretofore denied.

The investigations by the commission on the POW transfer issue continued through the 1990s, with plenary sessions held at least annually, augmented by technical talks between plenums. Co-chairmen changed with the death of General Volkogonov and the retirement of Ambassador Toon. In January 1996, General-Major Zolotarev took over the Russian side, and in December 1998, Major General Roland Lajoie (USA, Retired) succeeded Ambassador Toon.

Significant report results were issued in May 1995 and June 1996. In the 1995 joint USRJC interim report on the work of the commission, the Korea section stated,

*Despite the fact that no conclusive evidence has been discovered that American POWs were transferred into the former Soviet Union, the working group continues its search for new data which would substantiate such an hypothesis."*

The second report, issued in June 1996, was a U.S. side, unilateral comprehensive report on the work of the commission to date. This report stated, "the U.S. side of the Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs has collected a significant amount of information that suggests there is a high probability that during the Korean War American POWs were transferred from Korea to the Soviet Union."

## **The Compensation Issue**

Recall from earlier discussion that the North Koreans had passed to the UNC 46 sets of remains between 1990 and 1992. At the 28 July 1992 meeting of the MAC, the North Koreans requested compensation for costs incurred in exhuming and storing those 46 sets of remains. While the North Koreans relented to the UNC position that remains issues were under the MAC purview, they still opposed having UNC soldiers conducting remains recovery operations in North Korea. Through the fall and into the spring of 1993 both sides staffed a draft memorandum of understanding and negotiated the compensation issue. The North Korean demand for the remains was five million dollars. The UNC countered with an estimate of \$400,000; that figure was grounded in a long-standing U.S. policy that the U.S. would pay for fair and reasonable expenses incurred in the process of remains recovery. It was not a single dollar figure for each set of remains.

During this time Senator Smith, accompanied by staff members and a Department of State, East Asia Pacific Office, representative, visited Pyongyang. He attempted to get clarification on the live POW issue, requesting to have contact with any Americans held back after armistice. The North

Korean reply was that there were no Americans. Vice Minister Kang responded that any prisoners would have gone to China or the Soviet Union. Smith also requested access to DPRK POW archives; Kang replied that China controlled the U.S. POWs and had most of the written records.

Finally, after eight months of negotiations on the memorandum of understanding wording and dollar amounts, both MAC secretaries in a series of meetings held 8–20 June 1993 agreed to an amount of \$897,304 with the proviso that it would not set a precedent for future compensation. The agreement opened the way for a 12 July 1993 repatriation in Panmunjom of an additional 17 U.S. war dead.

The actual compensation payout date was 24 August 1993, which concluded with the signing by both parties of an “Agreement on Remains – Related Matters.” In this new climate of cooperation the North Koreans returned 131 total sets of remains in November and December 1993 and 14 the following September. Prior to the September repatriation, the North Koreans brought up the compensation issue for those returns handed over after the initial 46. Their \$4 million undocumented compensation claim was countered with a \$262,000 figure given by the UNC, an offer the KPA rejected.

The compensation negotiations went on in the backdrop of a new issue in the peninsular security dynamic. The North Korean nuclear reactor at Yongbyon in northwest DPRK was not only a major item of concern for the security and safety interests for the ROK, but also for worldwide counterproliferation. The buildup of conventional mobile ground forces and long-range artillery and rocket forces since the mid-1980s was also a major concern. In 1994, the Clinton administration sent presidential envoy Jimmy Carter to diffuse tensions. In an 18 June 1994 meeting, with prompting from Carter, President Kim Il Sung agreed that the DPRK would accept joint recovery operations (JROs). The KPA reaffirmed this at Panmunjom six days later in a MAC meeting.

The importance of the JROs emerged in this time frame as a critical element of any successful effort for getting resolution in Korean War cases. In fact, the UNC on 13 September 1994 asked the KPA at Panmunjom to halt unilateral recoveries. The U.S. Army CILHI, which had been examining remains turned over since 1990, encountered substantial problems in their identification effort. Of the 208 sets returned by 1994, only four had reached resolution by that time (and only eight total by the summer of 2000). Problems in identification were articulated in a joint U.S. Army CILHI/DPRK scientists’ meeting arranged by the UNC and held in Panmunjom in January 1994. The remains turned over by the North Koreans had significant commingling problems, identification media switching, and destruction evident from the excavation process.

The agreed framework of October 1994, intended to help stabilize the security situation on the peninsula, also called for the cooperation of North Korea on a range of issues, among them the resolution of Korean War losses. Nevertheless, the North Koreans would not discuss future recovery operations until compensation for the 1993 and 1994 remains returns was resolved. Through the fall of 1994, the North Koreans rebuffed a U.S. offer of \$262,000 and later refused a February 1995 offer of \$1 million. In December 1994 the North Koreans also turned down an offer to visit CILHI—this proposal was made to reinforce the message passed at the January 1994 CILHI/DPRK scientists’ meeting, which was to improve KPA understanding of the exacting standards and procedures used by the United States in identifying remains and to allay any suspicions of ulterior U.S. motives in North Korea.

In July 1995 a governmental interagency task force established by direction of the National Security Council, reached a consensus that the United States should explore all available channels to further the remains recovery effort. That event signaled a new era in the POW/MIA effort in Northeast Asia.





## Chapter 2: Opening the Door to Northeast Asia

On 24 July 1996, at Benchmark 131, three miles west of Unsan, DPRK, a U.S. Army CILHI search and recovery team and a DPMO liaison officer were working tirelessly in the North Korea summer heat to clear out successive layers of brown soil on a hill overlooking the Nammyon River Valley. The team was in its third week of operations in North Pyongan Province in far northwest North Korea. The preceding 14 days they had virtually dismantled a hill overlooking a reservoir in search of the remains of an F-80C pilot but could not find a trace. This new hill was the site of a

and 1 November 1950, then abandoned because of overwhelming pressure from Chinese forces. A North Korean civilian witness mentioned to KPA investigators that his father had buried an American on this hill in 1950. A test pit revealed human remains and American military artifacts, including a coffee packet and loose standard U.S. issue 30 caliber rounds. Six days later, the remains of a G Company, 8th Cavalry Regiment soldier were repatriated at Panmunjom with full military honors. Two months later the soldier's remains were identified and returned to his sister in Louisiana.



*First joint recovery operation to take place in North Korea, 1996*

forward outpost of Company G, 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, according to 8th Cavalry Regiment Periodic Information Reports found by researchers from DPMO in the U.S. Army Military History Institute in Carlisle, PA. The outpost had been occupied on 31 October

The aforementioned joint recovery operation (JRO) ushered in a new era in the POW/MIA accounting effort with North Korea. The U.S. government and the UNC had worked hard to lift the barriers that hindered progress in the issue prior to this event. Only months prior to the first ever

JRO in the DPRK the North Koreans and the UNC were still at an impasse on compensation for 162 sets of remains returned in 1993 and 1994. It was clear that central to any more breakthroughs in the POW/MIA effort in Northeast Asia would be the resolution of the compensation issue.

### **Development of the U.S./North Korea Bilateral Channel**

As mentioned in the previous chapter, an interagency meeting in Washington held under direction of the National Security Council (NSC) in July of 1995 resulted in the decision to explore all available channels to further the POW/MIA effort in Korea. The first opportunity came when the North Koreans, through UN Mission Minister/Counselor Han Song Ryol, contacted the Department of State Asia Pacific (Korea) office and inquired if the UNC invitation for DPRK representatives to visit Hawaii was still open. The response was affirmative and the North Koreans made formal notification of intent to visit there on 14 December 1995.

By direction of the NSC, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs chose James D. Wold, Brigadier General, U.S. Air Force (Retired) and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for POW/MIA affairs, to head the U.S. delegation to Hawaii. This marked the first time such an event was to be led by a senior-level DoD representative. It was also the first off-peninsula discussion dealing solely with Korean War POW/MIA issues. The U.S. side included Department of State, UNC, United States Forces Korea (USFK), U.S. Army Casualty and Mortuary Affairs Operations Center (CMAOC), and CILHI representation. The North Korean delegation, headed by Ambassador Kim Byong Hong, the disarmament and peace director, included representation from the KPA mission in Panmunjom and a North Korean

anthropologist from the Academy of Social Sciences.

The two delegations met in Honolulu, 10–14 January 1996. The Honolulu venue was key to demonstrating to the North Koreans the exacting procedures used by CILHI to conduct recovery and identification of remains. During the talks the United States pressed the North Koreans for the establishment of combined U.S.-North Korean teams to conduct search and recovery operations in the north. The U.S. delegation also brought up the issue of reports of live Americans from the Korean War era living in Pyongyang, a topic met with North Korean denials. The North Koreans continued to press for compensation, demanding \$3 million for their 162 unilateral recoveries in 1993 and 1994.

A forensic orientation for the North Korean delegation took place during the meeting. The North Korean anthropologist suggested that the United States was deliberately withholding remains identifications for political reasons. Once the CILHI recovery and identification procedures were demonstrated, the North Koreans admitted offline that their side had done some haphazard remains collection and handling. The U.S. delegation also provided the North Koreans a tour of a U.S. Air Force base, including the flight line, in hopes that the goodwill gesture would be reciprocated in North Korea when the U.S. teams deployed.

The third day of the talks, the outline for an agreement had been reached. The United States would pay \$2 million in February 1996 for uncompensated expenses for remains recovery and handling. The U.S. side would be allowed to preposition equipment in North Korea for two joint recovery operations to take place before the end of June 1996. But on the final day of talks the North Koreans balked, saying another round of talks would be needed before they would agree to conducting JROs. It was clear to the U.S. negotiators that the DPRK team was not yet prepared to reach a final agreement. As a result, the U.S. delegation

opted to walk away from the discussions to allow the North Koreans time to develop a coordinated KPA/Ministry of Foreign Affairs position.

Although the first round of talks failed to reach agreement, much momentum was gained, and within a month, Ambassador Han at the UN mission signaled to the Department of State, East Asia Pacific Office, that the North Koreans were ready for another round of talks. In an apparent concession, the North Korean government also announced that it was dismantling its remains recovery team. The respective heads of delegation for the second



***DPMO and the DPRK reach agreement in May 1996, New York***

meeting were the same as those in Hawaii three months earlier. The Grand Hyatt in New York was the venue, and 4–7 May 1996 was the scheduled time frame. Finally on 9 May, after both sides opted for extending the talks, they reached agreement on the \$2 million compensation payout for late May and technical discussions on JRO modalities in the first half of June. The North Koreans stated publicly following the meeting that technical talks in June would lead to recovery operations later in the year. True to their word, the U.S. government, through the UNCMAC, made the compensation payout 20 May 1996 at Panmunjom.

### **The Perry Proclamation and U.S. Congressional Interest**

The U.S. resolve for achieving POW/MIA accounting in Korea was reaffirmed in May 1996 when Secretary of Defense William Perry issued a policy proclamation calling for DoD to apply the necessary resources to conduct remains search and recovery and identification. He assigned the secretary of the U.S. Army the responsibility for conducting this effort. The proclamation is cited below:

## **DOD POLICY FOR KOREAN WAR ACCOUNTING**

*There are over 8,100 American servicemen who never returned home from the Korean War. Many of these men were buried in North Korea in temporary cemeteries or died in captivity. Many died on the battlefields and their remains could not be recovered. Others simply disappeared, their fates unknown. The potential exists to recover and identify significant numbers of remains and to resolve the fates of many of these men.*

*At the dedication of the Korean War Veterans Memorial, President Clinton reaffirmed this nation's commitment to resolving the fates of these men. At that time he declared, "We have not forgotten our debt to them or to their families and we will never stop working for the day when they can be brought home."*

*Accordingly, it is the policy of the DoD that efforts to resolve the case of our Korean War unaccounted for should receive a high priority. To accomplish this, the Department and the Services will dedicate resources commensurate with the tasks of developing and maintaining an accurate list of unaccounted for Korean War personnel, reestablishing contact with their families, and, in the longer term, preparing to identify them should we gain access to North Korea and recover their remains. Per DoD Directive 5110.10, dated July 16, 1993, the Defense POW/MIA Office will serve as the focal point for these efforts, providing policy oversight for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, ensuring effective coordination with the Services and relevant interagency components, including the Departments of State and Veterans Affairs, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Army, with the appropriate support from all services as DoD Executive Agent for Mortuary Affairs, will act as the lead operational agent for recovery and identification of remains.*

Also at this time in the U.S. House of Representatives, the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee took great interest in the new developments in North Korea and held hearings on the status of the POW/MIA issue with the Departments of State and Defense in June and October of 1996. The Missing Persons Act came into law as well, which, for the Korean War, set a number of information handling guidelines for DoD for the development of individual case files on those men still unaccounted-for.

## **Joint Recovery Operations**

From 9–15 June 1996, technical discussions took place in Pyongyang with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the KPA. The U.S. delegation was the first official Defense department team to visit Pyongyang. It was headed by J. Alan Liotta, Deputy Director, DPMO and accompanied by the commander of CILHI, Colonel Bill Jordan, U.S. Army. Senior Colonel Pak

Rim Su, Deputy KPA Panmunjom Mission and long-standing front man on the POW/MIA issue, headed the North Korean side. The sides agreed on two joint recovery operations, an F-80C site in Unsan County and a B-29 site in Ryonggang County near Nampo City. The North Koreans chose these two sites from a combined DPMO/CILHI-generated list of 12 air crash sites in various provinces.

The first JRO was to take place 10–30 July 1996 with an advance team arriving 2 July. The North Koreans authorized an eight-man search and recovery team and a two-man

call helicopter for medical evacuation, if ever needed. Costs incurred by the North Koreans, including labor, came to \$80,000, which was to be paid at the end of the operation. Planning on the U.S. end included close coordination with the Treasury Department. Since the DPRK is one of the countries affected by the Trading with the Enemy Act, CILHI was required to have a letter of exception approved by Treasury to conduct any transactions there.

The first joint recovery operation took place as scheduled in Unsan County, and the resulting remains recovery was highlighted at



*Technical talks in Pyongyang, 9-15 June 1996*

DPMO/Department of State liaison team to be housed in Panmunjom. Elaborate details on logistics were hammered out, and the North Koreans agreed on safeguard and storage of CILHI recovery equipment between operations. Significantly the North Koreans agreed to supply 60 laborers for site preparation, base camp security, and witness screening. Included in the package was an on-

the beginning of this chapter. Liotta had visited the second site, a B-29 crash with nine crewmen, near Nampo City, in May of 1996 when he accompanied U.S. Representative Bill Richardson on a visit to Pyongyang. A disturbing announcement by Senior Colonel Pak at a MAC meeting in Panmunjom on 26 July 1996 did not bode well for the second operation. He linked the second event to



progress on a KPA proposal to have general officer talks between the KPA and the U.S. military in Korea.

On 18 September 1996 the Republic of Korea (ROK) security forces discovered a Sango midget North Korean submarine run aground off the southeastern coast off South Korea. The ROK government immediately implemented regional security measures, and a two-week manhunt for suspected North Korean infiltrators began. Although the U.S. had sent a letter of intent to conduct the second joint recovery operation the day preceding the submarine incident, the DPRK never responded to the U.S. initiative. That forced the U.S. to cancel the second operation.

The submarine incursion set the recovery program back six months, and it was not until May of 1997 that both sides met again, this time in New York. The heads of delegation once again were DASD Wold and Ambassador Kim. Again the U.S. side included representatives from the UNCMAC, Department of State, CMAOC, and CILHI. The North Korean side included Senior Colonel Pak Rim Su from the KPA.

The United States presented a number of sites for excavation at the talks, including prison camp cemeteries, UN cemeteries, and battlefields. The North Koreans chose the site of a regimental sized battle that took place in November 1950 in which 292 men were still missing—the same general area of the previous year's recovery. The main contention in the talks involved the attempt to arrive at fair and reasonable expenses for North Korean labor and services performed. It was during these talks that the U.S. persuaded the North Koreans to agree to established compensation formulas, a significant breakthrough. The talks achieved another breakthrough of sorts when the North Koreans agreed to increase the number of operations in 1996 from two to three, which were to take place in July, August, and October. The North Koreans also agreed to allow U.S. representatives into their main military museum in Pyongyang for POW/MIA related

research. The North Koreans also authorized a family and veterans service organization visit into the DPRK. Logistics arrangements for the operation were validated in a 25–27 June 1997 New York meeting. The North Korean support package was again robust with 60–80 laborers and mission experts. Compensation for each operation was set at \$100,000.

The three operations took place as scheduled. The northwestern edge of the Unsan battlefield was the primary work site, where E and G Companies of the 8<sup>th</sup> Cavalry fought the CPV's 116th Division. The combined U.S. and North Korean team completed six remains recoveries from those operations. During a break in the operations the KPA hosted the first U.S. archival research effort on POW/MIA matters. The head of the North Korean side mentioned to the lead U.S. researcher, Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Man, U.S. Army, that Kim Chong Il had personally directed full cooperation of the staff. To that end the U.S. side was authorized to completely dismantle displays of captured artifacts and weapons for close examination. The U.S. team took more than 300 photos of captured artifacts and identification media during the four-day session.

A five-person family and veterans service organization visit to Pyongyang in October 1997 was the first ever authorized by the North Koreans. This visit allowed the U.S. government to put a human face on the POW/MIA constituency for the North Koreans. U.S. media also accompanied the team which included visits to recovery sites.

During these summer events tensions on the peninsula heated up again with the exchange of machine gun and mortar fire between ROK and North Korean guard posts in the DMZ and the temporary disappearance of a KPA soldier into the ROK. During the DMZ incident, the U.S. archival team continued its work uninterrupted although the KPA host warned that further provocations could result in the early expulsion of the U.S. archival team.

## **Establishment of the Annual December U.S./DPRK Talks**

A series of DPMO and North Korean UN mission coordination measures led to further talks in December 1997 between DPMO and the MFA and KPA. Deputy Director Liotta headed the U.S. side, which included representation from CMAOC, CILHI, and the UNCMAC. Again the U.S. pressed the North Koreans for access to prison camp cemeteries and battlefield sites. The Koreans did not approve of operations proposals in the POW camps but did choose a potentially lucrative new area near the Chongchon River, the site of intense battles between three U.S. divisions and the CPV in November 1950.

During the meetings, DPMO pressed for North Korean cooperation on resolving outstanding live-sighting reporting. He formally asked for access to U.S. Army deserters in order to help resolve reports of post-war live sightings of alleged U.S. POWs living in North Korea. Colonel Pak forcefully denied that the DPRK was holding Americans and responded to that request by saying the deserters did not want to speak with U.S. government representatives.

Out of the December 1997 talks came an agreement to conduct five operations, two archival research trips, and a family and veterans service organization visit. One of the issues generating momentum was the North Korean desire to eliminate the UNCMAC from the remains repatriation activities. In support of the UNC, the United States stood firm on the Panmunjom UNC/KPA repatriation ceremony protocol. The North Koreans agreed with reluctance and attempted to influence the March 1998 experts meeting on logistics to change the procedures. Further, both sides came to an understanding that each December they would meet to plan out the entire program for the following year. That convention has been followed each year since 1997.

The JROs in 1998 took place from April to November with breaks of several days between each operation. The operations were highly successful, though not without problems. Because of their continuing dissatisfaction with UNCMAC participation in the repatriations, the North Koreans delayed the return of two sets of remains from early May until Memorial Day. The North Koreans also attempted to link the repatriation issue with their desire to have general officer talks with the U.S. in Panmunjom without ROK participation. The United States responded by delaying the first archival mission by a week and by postponing the second operation. Nevertheless all five operations took place as both sides subsequently agreed to dates for a rescheduled second operation.

Possibly because of the postponement of the second operation, the U.S. archival research team was given only minimal access to new identification media and artifacts in the Pyongyang main military museum and a generally cool reception by the KPA hosts, a stark contrast to the previous years work. Nevertheless, the DPRK did grant the team's request for access to the national library, the People's Grand Study House, which housed 3,100 pages of commercial KPA battle accounts published in the 1960s. No access was given to materials that would have been much more beneficial, such as shootdown logs and war diaries. Honoring a DPRK request from the first archival trip in 1997, DPMO provided the director of the Pyongyang main military museum with U.S. commercial periodicals on Korean War equipment to improve the accuracy of the museum displays. A scheduled veteran service and MIA family organization visit, which included a tour of the recovery operations area, also took place in October.

A hallmark of the 1998 operations was the use of an advance team to investigate potential sites ahead of the recovery teams. That U.S. modification led to faster acquisition of witnesses and allowed for more excavations

to take place in the operations time frame. While the cost of each operation rose to \$134,000, largely because of higher fuel costs, the efficiencies achieved with the advance teams led to 22 recoveries for the five operations. A second family and veterans visit also occurred which included visits to recovery sites.

The December 1998 talks in New York were opened by DASD-POW/Missing Personnel Affairs Robert L. Jones. North Korean participation included a representative from the North Korean mission to the UN and the KPA's Senior Colonel Pak Rim Su of their Panmunjom Mission. The planned operations tempo was increased for the third straight year—a total of six joint recovery operations were planned from April to November, the first three to take place in North Pyongan Province (in northwest North Korea). The locations of the second three were to be determined at a midpoint meeting. The U.S. team size increased from 10 to 12 persons to allow for the advance investigative team effort and for vehicle maintenance mechanics. Concerning the repatriation issue, the North Koreans agreed to abide by protocols from past JRO repatriations, which also were in accord with guidelines established by the Armistice Agreement. Both sides agreed that any changes would need to be made under MAC purview at Panmunjom.

The first operation of 1999 resulted in six recoveries from the Chongchon River battle area. The third archival trip (the first two were conducted in 1997 and 1998) also went into Pyongyang (with a side trip to Sinchon) at the end of March for a week to examine previously unseen U.S. Korean War MIA identification media located in the main military museum in Pyongyang. Ominously, the North Koreans began signaling that they would not repatriate recovered remains through Panmunjom. Nevertheless, at the end of the first operation, they did conduct

repatriations through the established protocols as was assured to DPMO Deputy Director Liotta while visiting the first JRO. DPMO reiterated to the North Koreans that any changes to the established procedures would have to be brokered between them and the UNC.

The North Koreans suspended the second JRO midway because of fuel delivery problems. They also refused to repatriate four sets of recovered remains through Panmunjom. The KPA, in the interest of separating the UNC from the issue, developed three alternatives for repatriation in May 1999: repatriation through Panmunjom to a senior DoD representative, repatriation through Panmunjom using the CILHI team as the honor guard from the north side, or repatriation through Pyongyang by North Korean or Chinese aircraft to a location outside of the peninsula. Unfortunately, the KPA would not discuss these three methods with the UNC.

In consultations with the USFK and the National Security Council, DPMO began canceling joint recovery operations to allow for time for the North Koreans to review their decision on repatriations and honor the December 1998 agreement. There was no value seen to continuing operations only to have unrepatriated remains collect at Panmunjom to add to the problem. Operations were effectively suspended from June until September 1999. DPMO efforts to bring the North Koreans into compliance through their UN mission were unsuccessful. One last effort directed by the NSC to the UNC to bring up the issue in a Panmunjom MAC meeting failed to materialize.

Because it was evident that U.S. efforts to resolve the repatriation issue through Panmunjom or New York would continue to meet with gridlock, the NSC held a deputies committee meeting on 1 October 1999 to weigh various options. From this meeting the NSC directed DPMO to meet



directly with the KPA to come to agreeable repatriation terms. In New York, the MFA, on behalf of the KPA, met with Liotta and came to an agreement to repatriate the four sets of remains of U.S. servicemen via military airlift at Pyongyang Sunan Airport.

This repatriation occurred on 25 October 1999. A UNC honor guard aboard a C-17 cargo aircraft conducted the repatriation; a CILHI team ready to conduct the last operation offloaded. Also during the event, DASD Jones met with Lieutenant General Li Chong Bok, the senior KPA representative at Panmunjom. Talks were cordial and Li mentioned that operations in a new area, the Chosin Reservoir, could be possible for 2000. Li requested that the United States look into alternate means of compensation for JRO North Korean labor support and suggested the United States substitute a humanitarian aid package, namely clothing for North Korean children. DPMO agreed to look into possible ways to accomplish this.

The year's operations, although substantially interrupted, ended on a high note with a November 11 repatriation of another three sets of remains from the last JRO, again on the

tarmac of Sunan Airport in Pyongyang. Moreover, U.S.–North Korean relations took a big step with the publication of the Perry Report. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry was the president's policy advisor to North Korea. His year-long examination of all aspects of U.S. policy toward North Korea resulted in his recommendation to ease sanctions on the country if the DPRK fulfilled steps to reduce tensions. This allowed for the flow of limited commerce between the countries for the first time.

At the 13–17 December 1999 Berlin talks to establish the year 2000 program, DASD Jones and Li led off with a discussion on compensation for joint recovery operations. The North Koreans presented detailed requirements for humanitarian aid, which included materials for a clothing factory. Jones responded to Li that legally only the Department of State could act on such requests and in fact the Department of State, East Asia Pacific Office, had recently called the North Korean UN mission on this requirement to get more information. The North Koreans also offered to establish a nationwide bureaucracy from the central government down to county level to

conduct remains searches, to be funded in part by the United States. The stage set, Jones and Li agreed to allow their negotiators to come to specifics but cautioned that DoD could not act on humanitarian aid package requirements. The U.S. side again pressed for access to the Chosin Reservoir and the prison camp UN cemeteries while the DPRK offered further access to the Chongchon River. In general, however, the North Koreans indicated they were not authorized to allow a program for year 2000 without a robust U.S. humanitarian aid package. While no agreement was reached at these talks, the North Koreans



***Mr. Bob Jones (left center) meets with North Korean Lieutenant General Li Chon Bok (right center) in Berlin***

called DPMO in January 2000 for renewed dialogue, inviting the U.S. delegation to come to Pyongyang to investigate four or five new unilateral recoveries and that the North Koreans had announced in a press release. Their announcement of the discovery of remains during land reclamation work in North Pyongan Province came on the heels of a 21 January 2000 search and recovery mission conducted by CILHI in the ROK side of the DMZ in western Chorwon. Both sides suggested a meeting to get the talks on track and discuss the North Korean remains recovery, but by the spring of 2000 the venue and agenda were still under discussion.

Following the Berlin meeting, DPMO representatives traveled to Seoul to discuss USFK proposals to conduct search and recovery operations in the south. At this meeting, DPMO agreed with the USFK and ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) to form a working group to develop sites for future recovery work. In a March 2000 meeting, the two sides presented their remains recovery programs coinciding with the Korean War 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary commemoration. CILHI presented its plan for conducting three recovery operations for the year, and DPMO explained the merits of its oral history program, suggesting the ROK MND might come across information on U.S. losses in their search for witness information. The U.S. delegation further asked the ROK MND to staff a draft memorandum of understanding addressing future remains recoveries in South Korea. Both sides agreed to notify the other of planned recovery efforts in the south in the event that remains of the Korean War allies were found. Deputy Director, J. Alan Liotta and MND representative Brigadier General Kim Kyoing Duck later signed the MOU in Seoul during a joint meeting on 24 June 2000.

In May DPMO and the KPA agreed to a meeting of their senior representatives in Kuala Lumpur from 6-8 June with no preconditions. From this meeting Mr. Liotta and Senior Colonel Pak came to a five-operation agreement. Unsan and Kujang Counties of North Pyongan Province were the designated operational areas, where the North Koreans indicated they had discovered four or five remains while engaged in land reclamation projects. The time frame for the operations was 25 June to 11 November.

This meeting was highly significant, as it had broken a six-month deadlock in the POW/MIA program with North Korea. In addition, the U.S. team increased from 14 to 20 members in order to allow for investigative elements to have Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Medical Aid man capabilities.

In September 2000, the DASD for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs met with Senior Colonel Pak Rim Su in Pyongyang. During this visit he accepted nine sets of remains from the third JRO and in discussions with the North Koreans, reemphasized the need for the JRO effort to expand into the Chosin Reservoir and the UN registered cemeteries and POW camps. The North Koreans continued to express desires for the U. S. side to provide a robust humanitarian aid package, in addition to JRO compensation.

Also in September 2000, Mr. Liotta accompanied by JCS and CILHI representatives, traveled to Pyongyang to discuss technical issues. While humanitarian compensation issues continued to be a problem for the North Koreans, the U.S. team was allowed for the first time to visit the Chosin Reservoir to survey potential recovery sites for 2001. Joint recovery operations in 2000 were highly successful, doubling the recovery rate for any previous year since the beginning of the program in 1996.



*Chosin Reservoir, east side near Sinhung, September 2000*

## Efforts with China

Recognizing that the key to resolving many of the Korean War missing cases was through the cooperation from the People's Republic of China (PRC), the DPMO, along with other segments of the U.S. government, worked hard in the 1990s to establish a viable program with Beijing. Cooperation by the Chinese had been spotty with respect to the Korean War. Department of State efforts through Geneva in the 1950s secured the release of 15 aviators held from the Korean War until 1955. Largely due to the Nixon overtures to China in 1972, the Chinese began to release Cold War-era CIA officers and to provide information on other officers who were never recovered. They repatriated Vietnam War pilots' remains and allowed U.S. investigators to conduct follow-up searches on other losses from that war. The Chinese were and continue to be proactive on brokering access to World War II crash sites on their territory as well. Moreover, the Chinese agreed to all U.S. requests to place U.S. Army forward logistics coordinators in Beijing in support of the JROs in North Korea from 1996 to 2000.

The U.S. government has raised the POW/MIA issue with China at high levels on numerous occasions. The message for the U.S. government was carried by the president, the secretaries of defense and state and their assistant secretaries, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commander of U.S. Pacific Forces, and the U.S. ambassador to China. Also brought up with the Chinese were specific cases of missing servicemen. In June 1992, Undersecretary of State Mickey Kanter passed a 125-name Korean War MIA list to Chinese Ambassador Zhu Qizhen. The list had been derived during the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs investigations and was characterized as a list of men questioned by the Russians during the war and possibly sent to the USSR from China. A month later the Chinese responded through the New China News

Agency that no U.S. POWs had been transferred through China.

In January 1993, acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs Mr. Edward Ross led a DoD and Pacific Forces Command (PACOM) delegation to Beijing. Their intent was to garner support for U.S. POW/MIA accounting efforts concerning WWII, the Korean War and Southeast Asian War. This visit was reciprocated when a Chinese delegation led by Senior MFA representative Mr. Yang Jiechi visited PACOM and CILHI. Following these visits the Chinese authorized investigations of two Southeast Asia and a WWII aircraft loss incident.

In July 1994 and October 1996, the U.S. embassy in Beijing passed to the MFA specific aviation losses, two F-86 pilots, a B-29 crew of 13, and the cases of three unrepatriated POWs. While the Chinese have consistently agreed to take on specific cases, their information on U.S. government Korean War loss requests provided no new leads for U.S. casualty analysts.

In the interest of establishing a regular schedule of talks with Chinese counterparts, DASD Jones began visits to the MFA in Beijing in January 1999. In his initial visit, he met for the first time a Chinese designated point of contact for POW/MIA issues, Chen Ming Ming. Jones pressed the MFA for any information on cases presented to the Chinese through the Department of State on DPMO's behalf in 1996. He also requested access to war archives, in particular prison camp records, as the Chinese had administered the permanent POW camps on the Yalu River from late 1950. Access to veterans who might be aware of specific air or ground incidents involving U.S. forces would also be helpful, he noted. While Chen reported finding no information on the Korean War cases passed in 1996, he was open to regularized meetings for the purpose of accepting continued case inquiries.

An event that provided impetus to the issue was the visit of Premier Zhu Rongji to the United States in April 1999. During discussions,



President Clinton impressed upon the premier the importance of the POW/MIA issue to the American people, mentioning that the office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. John Hamre, had responsibility. Premier Zhu responded that the Chinese would act on specific case requirements and designated Vice Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi as his point of contact. During that time Senator Robert Smith also forwarded a letter to the president requesting assurances that the Chinese military agree to disclose information on the missing from the Korean War.

A May 1999 meeting set between DPMO, MFA and PLA counterparts in Beijing was abruptly cancelled when U.S. warplanes mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. That event curtailed relations on all DoD programs with China for six months. Nevertheless, the Chinese agreed to meet in September 1999 in Beijing and accepted from Jones a packet of 44 Korean War and two Cold War case inquiries. The Korean War inquiries involved unaccounted-for Army, Air Force, and Marines servicemen who were in Chinese-administered prison camps on the Yalu River from 1951 to 1953, men missing from November 1950 battles and main line of resistance firefights with the Chinese, air losses, and names of missing men mentioned in Chinese periodicals. Chen maintained that the Korean War records were still closed at that meeting but agreed to research the cases and to look into a veterans and family member visit to Beijing for 2000.

## **Progress in Talks**

The next semiannual meeting between DASD Jones and the MFA took place on 31 January 2000. Chen reported that he had no information on the 44 Korean War cases passed for research in September 1999. Moreover, on Jones's request concerning a family and veterans visit to China to coincide with the Korean War 50th anniversary commemorations, Chen mentioned no decision had yet been made nor had one been made on an invitation for his office to visit the United States.

On a highly positive note, Chen offered to begin making available for oral history interviews Chinese Korean War veterans who were prison camp cadre and indicated that it could start later in the year. In addition, he mentioned that academic exchanges would be authorized in unclassified museums and libraries. These talks were a watershed in the relationship, as they marked the first time China accepted DoD overtures to pursue elements of the Korean War POW/MIA program involving DoD researchers and oral history program interviewers on the Chinese mainland.

During the DASD Jones September 2000 visit to Beijing, DPMO analysts conducted the first interviews of four Chinese Korean War veterans, all who had been prison camp administrators. Also during this visit the Chinese accepted two more MIA case inquiries, involving Korean and Cold War air losses.



***DASD Jones meets with Mr. Chen Ming Ming of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing***



On 23 June 1999, Department of Defense (DoD) Public Affairs office announced the identification of two U.S. servicemen lost during the Korean War in November 1950, Corporal Charles Tillman of the 9th Infantry Regiment and Private First Class Herbert Ardis of the 24th Infantry Regiment. A combined U.S. and North Korean search and recovery team operating in Kujang County, North Pyongan Province, in June and July 1998, discovered their remains. Extraordinary effort was expended by a handful of casualty analysts, mortuary affairs specialists, and forensics experts from three U.S. government agencies to research the loss site, conduct the excavation, and carry out the forensic examination and DNA testing to identify these men 49 years following their date of loss.

Per U.S. policy, a missing service person is accounted-for by their being returned alive to U.S. control, by the return of their remains, or through the establishment of conclusive proof that he/she is not recoverable. The highest priority is the return of a live American. In some cases, because of the destructive nature of war, neither a live return nor the return of remains is possible. The almost 300 Korean War cases of air losses over water are typical of those least likely to be resolved. For several reasons, the Korean War presents a considerable challenge to the effort to achieve an accounting of the more than 8,100 men still missing. The passage of time, the lack of surviving witnesses, the limitations on access to loss area, and the paucity of records combine to form roadblocks that have hindered the accounting process.

Nevertheless, DoD organizations pursuing this issue have several means of finding answers that result in case resolution. Despite the passage of more than 40 years, relevant records are still being discovered in disparate archives worldwide, witnesses with direct knowledge on losses are still being located, and recoveries and identifications

continue to be made. The means by which we develop information on those still missing and make the recoveries so that the missing men ultimately can be identified are described in this chapter.

### Personnel Missing Korea List

Fundamental to the accounting issue is the determination of the realm of all possible servicemen who are still unaccounted-for from the Korean War. DPMO researchers in 1995 noted the existence of three separate U.S. government lists of such missing servicemen: the Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI) automated database list, the Directorate of Operations and Reports (DIOR), Washington Headquarters Services List, and the American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC) list. A comparison of the three lists reflected significant disparities among them. The initial consolidation produced a listing that was more than 600 names longer than any individual list. Name misspellings and duplications were common, and numerous resolved cases were found on the lists.

DPMO began steps to create an all-inclusive list of Americans unaccounted-for from the Korean War, which was titled the Personnel Missing Korea list, or PMKOR. In 1996 DPMO analysts and reservists called to active duty at DPMO for this purpose compared, evaluated, and merged the three separate lists into the PMKOR master draft. Upon completion of the consolidation, DPMO staffed the list with the Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force service casualty and mortuary affairs offices, as well as the originators of the three lists—CILHI, DIOR, and ABMC—to ensure accuracy. With the input of the services and activities, DPMO made changes, continued to review the document for accuracy, and posted the document on the DPMO Web site for public access in February 1999.

The PMKOR is a living document consisting of more than 160,000 data fields and 8,171 names of men still unaccounted-for. Analysts at DPMO continually update the document based on documented correction recommendations from the services and from the public. The goal is to develop and maintain the most accurate listing possible. In addition, DPMO's supporting information systems staff has improved presentation of the document over time to allow for individual visitors to the Web site to search the list by state or service.

|   |           |
|---|-----------|
|   | Total:    |
| Killed In Action                            | 1,798     |
| Missing In Action                           | 4,261     |
| Non-Battle Death                            | 93        |
| Prisoner Of War                             | 2,053     |
| _____                                       | _____     |
| PMKOR Total                                 | 8,205     |
| Remains Identified after<br>OPERATION GLORY | <u>34</u> |
| Unaccounted-For                             | 8,171     |

***Statistics for Korean War unaccounted-for from the PMKOR***

## **Live American Issue**

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the first priority of the U.S. government is the safe return of a missing American. U.S. Forces Far East Command efforts in the immediate postwar period centered on the determination of who was still possibly alive in the Communist prison camp system. The list of 944 servicemen mentioned in Chapter 1 was a group of men whose fate was undetermined at the time and for whom the services and U.S. Forces Far East believed the Communist side should be able to account. The services conducted research on this list for years in the effort to account for these men.

Buttressing the notion that some men might be still held at the end of the war was the wartime reporting of trainloads of Caucasians and African Americans being shipped from China to the USSR. Lieutenant Colonel Phil Corso (Retired) testified before the Military Personnel Affairs Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee in 1996 that about 900 such men were held back from Operation Big Switch. After the 1996 hearings, Mr. Corso explicitly mentioned to a DPMO representative that he had been referring only to the holding back of sick and wounded at Operation Little Switch.

Further, starting in 1968 occasional defectors from North Korea reported seeing or hearing about Korean War-era American and other UN POWs still living in that country. Reporting by these defectors indicated consistently that these men taught English language and American customs in military colleges in Pyongyang and appeared in feature films. The reports characterized their status variously as POWs, deserters, or Americans left from the Korean War.

Resolution of reporting on live sightings of prisoners is a top intelligence community requirement. Through the aid of an array of sources, including those of the intelligence community, most of the defector



reports were attributed to four of six U.S. Army deserters who defected to North Korea between 1962 and 1965.

Also of considerable interest are reports from the South Korean press on the escapes of men out of North Korea identified as former ROK soldiers. Those reports bring some hope to members of the public that some Americans could still be alive. The ROK government has acknowledged that some of these men coming out of North Korea were at one time ROK soldiers. The ROK prisoner legacy is unfortunately wrapped up in the North-South relations paradigm that does not directly relate to the U.S. prisoner issue. During the war, the KPA controlled the ROK prisoners, and the Chinese controlled the American and UN prisoners; the two groups were segregated, so the former ROK POWs are unlikely to have knowledge about captive Americans in the postwar period. Both North and South have accused each other of holding back prisoners, and indeed the ROK government in 2000 in a goodwill gesture released North Korean guerillas held since the 1950s. Nevertheless these former ROK soldiers, who were integrated into North Korean society in the 1950s and had families, are, like the other defectors, of interest for any information they might have on live Americans.

DPMO has conducted considerable research in an effort to determine which POW populations could have been held back. DPMO analysts noted the returning POWs reported witnessing the deaths during the Korean War of the vast majority of those men in camps and on death march routes. This reporting essentially served to contradict the notion of mass transfer of POWs—put another way, the sketchy reports of trainloads of POWs lacked for named candidates because the fate of the known POW population was largely sorted out by the Far East Command and the services; the reduction of the list of 944 potential prisoners to 389 was a measure of the accounting effort at that time.

The Far East Command September 1953 report, “A Study in Repatriation,” included statistics separating out African-American POW lists in an apparent effort to determine if large numbers could have been part of the train transfers reported. The report concluded that the vast majority of known African-American POWs were returned or were known to have died. Moreover, with time, the services and the Far East Command came to discover that some of the men on the list of 944 were never in enemy hands. DPMO research on information available on the list of 389 revealed that only 235 of these men might have been in enemy hands at one time during the war.

## **Joint Recovery Operations and Identifications**

Joint recovery operations in North Korea in recent years have shown the most promise for resolving the cases of unaccounted-for servicemen from the Korean War. As previously mentioned in this chapter, considerable preparation effort took place before the first excavation in July 1996 in Unsan County could begin.

Chapter 2 mentioned the DPMO and the UNC negotiation effort to obtain agreement from the North Koreans to allow for JROs on their territory. It was critically important to allow for this recovery convention to ensure that U.S. forensic standards would be applied from investigation and discovery through final identification. Problems encountered in the unilateral North Korean returns included destruction during collection, commingling, and commission of errors in matching identification media to remains. CILHI's determination that up to 70 individuals were represented in the first 46 remains returned demonstrates the commingling problem.

CILHI, through Department of the Army manpower action, received sufficient staffing increases in the mid-1990s to support

the dispatch of eight-man search and recovery teams for multiple annual JROs in North Korea. That authorization included the hiring of up to 21 anthropologists to support the worldwide recovery and CILHI-based identification effort. Other requirements for the makeup of each search and recovery team included a team leader, a linguist/interpreter, an EOD




***CILHI and KPA joint excavation site***

technician, a medical aid, and multiple mortuary specialists. The DPRK further authorized in 1999 the addition of mechanics to the team to improve vehicle readiness.

Because the DPRK and the United States are still technically at war, it is critical to maintain the lines of communication at the ministerial and departmental levels of both governments while U.S. soldiers are operating deep inside North Korea and while POW/MIA researchers or family groups and veterans service organization delegations are visiting the country. DPMO, during each of the 16 joint recovery operations, has placed a two-person U.S. government liaison element in Pyongyang; the liaison reports directly to the DASD, which is the NSC's designated point of contact to North Korea for POW/missing personnel matters. This liaison is the link to the remotely

deployed search and recovery teams, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Korean People's Army, and the U.S. side and is critical to facilitating the resolution of operational and logistics issues arising during operations.

The search and recovery teams since 1996 have operated in two general battle areas within Unsan and Kujang Counties, North Pyonggan Province, located in northwest North Korea. In Unsan County in 1996 and 1997 the search and recovery teams systematically cleared away battle positions of E and G Companies, 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, and made seven recoveries. In 1998 and 1999 the teams traveled to defensive positions and unit withdrawal routes for Task Force Dolvin/Wilson (made up of elements of the, 27th Infantry, 35th Infantry, 65th Engineers, 8th Army Rangers, and 89th Tank Battalion) and the 24th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, to the west of the Chongchon River. They also operated in battle areas of all three regiments of the 2nd Infantry Division (9th, 23rd, and 38th) and the 72nd Tank and 2nd Engineer Battalions, located in November 1950 on both the east and west sides



***CILHI and KPA base camp***

of the Chongchon. Year 2000 operations have included recoveries from both Unsan and Kujang counties.

The team packets for each search and recovery team included dozens of the field search cases for the battle of Unsan and the Battle of the Chongchon River. Field search case data had been



the Korean War, and augmented with additional data from DPMO research. With the important addition of local witness reporting, over 90 total remains recoveries were made from all operations from 1996 through 2000. Specialized equipment such as global positioning systems, metal detectors, ground penetrating radar, and cesium magnetometers (for identifying soil disturbances) aid in the excavations.

At the end of each JRO, prior to the repatriation ceremonies, a joint forensic review has been conducted to assess whether remains recovered were likely those of U.S. servicemen. While six identifications have been made on the 90 plus recoveries, several others are under analysis and pending at CILHI. Painstaking work is involved in that effort as casualty analysts—through research — narrow the populations of the possible men lost in the area of a recovery. Identification media found with remains aid in the process but are considered circumstantial evidence. In the case of Private First Class Ardis, 69 men were lost from the unit fighting in the general area in which his remains were found. The determination of race and stature of the remains narrowed the scope of individuals down to 21. Further examination of the dentition through the Computer-Assisted Postmortem

co-developed by the U.S. Eighth Army Graves Registration Services and the Office of the Historian during the war and included the known losses and unit locations on the battlefield. Those data were augmented by information from DPMO and CILHI archival research and veterans' oral history interviews. Included in the team packets are known air loss crash sites from the air search cases, developed during



***Anthropologist, team leader and DPMO analyst review proposed recovery sites***



Identification System database revealed highly compelling similarities of the dental remains to the dental characteristics in his personnel file. And finally, a comparison of the family mitochondria DNA (mtDNA) sample at the Armed Forces DNA Laboratory to the mtDNA of the remains revealed a maternal DNA match.

Battlefields are not the only interest in the JRO program. In the annual meetings with the North Koreans, DASD Robert Jones has pressed for access to the Yalu Prison Camp



***CILHI excavation in Russia***



***Mr. Phil O'Brien (r), Korean War analyst, concludes an interview with a Korean War POW, James Macijeski***

clusters near the Suiho Reservoir and Chunggangin (the Apex area) and UN registered cemeteries in Wonsan, Hungnam, and Koto-Ri, as a means to improve on the success of the JRO recovery rate. Thus far the North Koreans have denied access to these areas.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the CILHI teams have conducted several operations in South Korea, resulting in the identification of two U.S. Army soldiers in the 1980s. CILHI teams also traveled to Japan to search the site of a lost U.S. Air Force aviator, resulting in identification in 1992. In addition, a CILHI team visited the former Soviet Union in 1998, following up on a 1951

eyewitness report of Americans seen in a Novosysoevka hospital in the Soviet Far East. A joint exhumation of cemetery plots near the hospital grounds did not reveal the presence of American remains, however.

## **Oral History Program**

Recognizing the dearth of surviving records on Korean War missing servicemen, DASD James Wold in 1996 directed DPMO's Northeast Asia Division to attend POW reunions for the purpose of obtaining information on circumstances of loss for those still missing. The fire at the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC) in St. Louis in 1973 destroyed 80 percent of the individual servicemen's records; so recontacting potential witnesses was key to developing new information. DPMO researchers have attended the Korean War Ex-POWs and Tiger Survivors reunions every year since 1995, interviewing well over 400 former POWs from these events and from the POW Camp 2 Association reunions. Much information on camp cemeteries and persons buried in them has been gleaned from these interviews. Also from the interviews, DPMO analysts were able to retrace the stream of the POWs from the point of capture through the temporary holding points in Kanggae, Suan and Pukchin Tarigol into the Yalu River area prison camps.

The Research and Analysis (RA) directorate of DPMO in 1997 expanded the oral history program to include numbered division association reunions. That year, DPMO began

attending reunions of ground divisions with highly significant Korean War combat roles, and thus greater numbers of missing. Associations visited included the 1st Cavalry and 1st Marine Divisions, the Chosin Few (including the Army chapter), the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 25th, and 45th Infantry Divisions. These contacts were further expanded to Eighth Army separate battalion functions, such as the 2nd Mortar Chemical Battalion, and included roundtable events with unit historians of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division. Attendance at combat unit reunions yielded another 600 interviews. DPMO researchers also attended a reunion of the 8th Attack Squadron, an Air Force B-26 Bomber unit, in an effort to clarify shootdown incidents.

The combat veteran interviews



***DPMO and American Embassy, Beijing confer with Chinese Korean War veterans***

substantially expanded DPMO's knowledge of the unit dispositions and conduct of the battles of Unsan, the Chongchon River, the Chosin Reservoir, and Outpost Harry. Some interviews

resulted in the actual pinpointing of mass graves. Over 100 interviews yielded direct or secondhand knowledge of men who died, information often not previously available in the casualty files. Information from the interviews on gravesites has been passed to CILHI for use in the search and recovery team packets. In service casualty office family contacts with the next of kin, this information has proven invaluable to aid in providing information on loss incidents as well.

DPMO regularly attends eight to twelve U.S. veterans reunions per year. In negotiations with the North Koreans and Chinese, DPMO has requested access to the veterans of the Korean War adversaries. In early 2000 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the PRC offered to make available Chinese veterans for interview, starting with prison camp cadre. In September 2000 in Beijing, DPMO analysts interviewed Chinese veterans from POW Camps 1 and 5.

## **USRJC Interviews of Russian Veterans**

The U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs (USRJC) has had considerable success locating Russian veterans from the Korean War for the purpose of conducting interviews in their research. The Russian side has allowed virtually unlimited access to veterans throughout Russia. Access to the Russian Ministry of Defense archives at Podolsk (to be discussed in more detail later in this chapter) has facilitated the interview program of DPMO's joint Commission Support Directorate. Unit records in these archives name individuals who took part in searches for downed aircraft. Such records document wreckage locations and sometimes the fate of the crew. The records further mention pilots and intelligence officers who may have encountered or interrogated live American POWs in North Korea. Moscow-based

personnel have located and interviewed more than 500 of these Soviet veterans of the Korean War, seeking further information on missing American servicemen and possible transfers of POWs to the former Soviet Union.

Several of those interviewed recounted their personal experiences with POWs being transferred to or seen already in the Soviet Union. Some veterans related information given them on official orders concerning a transfer program, and still others provided secondhand information they had heard about the transfer of American POWs. JCSD researchers also interviewed a former Chinese



***Soviet veteran Dmitrij Grogorevich Miroshnich***



official who stated he personally participated in the transfer of POWs to the Soviet Union, as well as a former North Korean official who had heard secondhand reports of such transfers. Journalists and other researchers have heard similar reports from persons serving in high levels, including the commander of Soviet forces operating in North Korea during the war, General Georgi Lobov, and a senior KGB officer.

The U.S. side of the USRJC also conducted an oral history interview program in Eastern Europe. This program included veterans who served in Korea from the former Eastern Bloc, as well as numerous survivors of the Soviet gulag there. A contractual arrangement with a research organization in Poland yielded several reports of American servicemen seen in the gulag.

Russian and East European reporting has not yet led to the discovery of physical evidence indicating that Americans were transferred to the Soviet Union. However, as mentioned above, some of those interviewed stated that this did happen, and the USRJC continues to pursue this matter.

In December 1998, the USRJC organized a meeting between American Korean War pilots and Russian members of the USRJC. The unprecedented meeting was aimed at bringing U.S. and Soviet veterans together to help both sides clarify the fate of their unaccounted-for personnel from the Korean War. Five American veterans attended, among them, famous fliers such as Lieutenant General William "Earl" Brown (U.S. Air Force, Retired) and Brigadier General Paul Kauttu (U.S. Air Force, Retired). These veterans described air battles that took place nearly 50 years ago. One veteran provided gun camera footage showing the destruction of a MiG 15. The American veterans offered to help the Russians contact other American Korean War fighter pilots who might be able to shed light on the fates of unaccounted-for Soviet pilots.

## **Punchbowl Disinterment**

By the time the forensic mortuary at Kokura, Japan, closed in February 1956, 421 of the remains returned during Operation Glory were assessed to be American but were still unidentifiable by name. These, with others recovered at sea and in South Korea, became part of the shipment of 848 "Unknowns" buried at the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific (also known as the Punchbowl) that May. Over the years, other recoveries from South Korea have been added, and the Unknown population now stands at 865.

The 421 unknowns from North Korea present a special challenge, but also an opportunity, for the North Korean government often made tentative identifications, which U.S. forensic experts accepted or rejected on a case-by-case basis, and also provided locations of discovery, many of which have proven to be correct in the case of identified remains. All unknowns have forensic files at CILHI, and the combination of improved physical techniques for articulation and matching, plus the application of available DNA technologies, opens a very real possibility that some of the remains now in the Punchbowl may eventually be identified. This understood, DPMO developed a policy in May 1999 authorizing Punchbowl exhumations, provided the high probability of identification, and based on the improved identification technologies. Two trial exhumations on 15 September 1999 began the process, and they remain under analysis at CILHI. Mortuary preparations using a powdered formaldehyde substance taken at the time of interment have made mtDNA typing difficult for the exhumed remains, although it is not yet known if all Operation Glory remains were treated in that fashion.





***September 1999 Punchbowl disinterment***

## Archival Research

DoD conducts archival research for two purposes—to find information that will assist in locating missing servicemen and to inform the next of kin and the public. To develop information on the circumstances of loss on servicemen unaccounted-for nearly 50 years, historic records repositories both inside and outside the United States must be searched. The information on loss incidences is used by casualty analysts and mortuary specialists conducting field operations. It is further passed to the next of kin and to the national archives for public access.

Congressional interest in the Korean War POW/MIA issue in the mid-1990s led to the appropriation of \$1 million of the FY 1995 defense budget toward locating Korean War records. With this funding, the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress located 25,000 pages of Korean War materials germane to the issue; most of the documents were found at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in various locations. Included were thousands of eyewitness reports that clarified the fates of POWs. (These were some of the documents generated from the POW returnee debriefing program.)

Also affecting Korean War era archives was the enactment of 50 US Code 435 (the amended McCain bill), which established the Archivists of the United States as the custodian of Korean War documents. The bill further made NARA responsible for making these records available to the public.

In May 1996, DPMO held a conference of archivists to identify repositories outside of NARA where POW/

Missing Personnel records might be located. Archivists from the services and NARA were represented. Participants reported that multitudes of records were scattered in a myriad of locations, many of which were not well indexed. After this meeting, a list of over 350 repositories was developed for targeting research.

To locate and evaluate the sheer number of these records presents a daunting task. Since the May 1996 meeting, DPMO archival researchers have now located 450 libraries, archives, and special collections in both foreign and domestic repositories that



*Archival Research in St. Louis*

could hold information concerning unaccounted-for personnel. Since 1995 DPMO archival researchers have visited more than 100 of these archives, both domestic and foreign. DPMO has been successful in reviewing records in U.S. governmental and public archive collections. Additionally DPMO researchers have performed research in such foreign collections as Hanoi, Socialist Republic of Vietnam; Vientiane, Laos Democratic Republic; Phnom Penh,

Cambodia; Canberra, Australia; Pyongyang, DPRK; Beijing, PRC; Seoul, ROK; and London, Great Britain.

During the past two years alone the Special Projects – Archival Research (SPAR) directorate has obtained more than 300,000 pages of information relating to Americans unaccounted-for from World War II, the Korean War, and the war in Southeast Asia. To maximize use of travel funds, SPAR researchers have identified and visited all available repositories when attending DPMO family updates in locations throughout the United States, a program that has proven highly successful. Research at the National Archives in College Park, MD (NARA II), and the Washington National Records Center (WNRC) in Suitland, MD, has proven very fruitful, resulting in discovery of many thousands of pages of relevant information, which was ultimately forwarded to the service casualty offices and the families of those who remain unaccounted-for.

In the Washington area, NARA II remains a main focus for records research for SPAR and RA. Archival personnel continued to review services records stored there as well as other classified archives it maintains. For example, in early 1999, DPMO researchers uncovered almost 15,000 classified documents (21 cubic feet) from the 1950–1954 UNC/Army Forces Far East Command records at the WNRC in Suitland, MD, that related to unaccounted-for servicemen. From these documents, 4,800 pages were electronically scanned into a DPMO database. These documents were then reviewed for POW/Missing Personnel matters in coordination with the U.S. Army declassification team and sent to the casualty analysts for further evaluation.

In 1999, DPMO archival researchers and the U.S. Army declassification team cooperated to identify and declassify an extensive collection of UNC POW/MIA accounting records from 1950–1954. The Army declassification project initially identified 700

boxes with potential DPMO/Missing Personnel information. SPAR archivists and RA analysts reviewed them and identified 145 boxes for further examination, citing 31 cubic feet of records, which directly pertain to the POW/Missing Personnel issue. DPMO researchers and analysts scanned these records, consisting of approximately 4,800 pages of data, including more than 550 Far East Air Forces Casualty Questionnaires, which were completed by repatriated Air Force POWs. These electronic images are being indexed and incorporated into a fully searchable database containing accounting data from all of the services. With the cooperation and assistance of WNRC staff, the records were moved from the WNRC in Suitland to the Army's declassification facility Arlington, VA, reviewed, and scanned. Of special note was the discovery of one of the iterations of the 944 list and the 6004th Air Intelligence Squadron reports, which DPMO researchers had been searching for since 1995.

Additionally, it was at WNRC that SPAR archivists uncovered a 19-cubic-foot accession from the Kokura Mortuary in Japan that contained a roster of Operation Glory (1954–1956) repatriated remains. It appears to be a bona fide list of the 4,167 remains that were returned to U.S. control through the UNC after the Korean War, which SPAR researchers have sought since 1995. In addition, records found in this accession could facilitate the identification of some of the 865 unidentified U.S. personnel who are interred at the Punchbowl.

DPMO researchers made 10 trips to the NPRC in St. Louis, MO, during 1998 and 1999. They pored over more than 500 boxes of records—more than 1,000 linear feet of records—some of which are nearly 50 years old. The researchers had to leaf through each individual page to determine whether the information contained therein was of benefit to the POW/MIA mission.

Ground unit records often hold information on fighting positions where units had unrecovered casualties. DPMO




concentrated on reviewing records from the U.S. Army regimental diaries for the period of November through December 1950—the timeframe of the first major Chinese involvement on the ground—to obtain an accurate depiction of battles in which thousands of men were captured, missing, or killed in major engagements. To date, 45 reels of microfilm containing these reports have been reviewed. Pertinent data gathered from all of these records were forwarded to the appropriate service casualty office for dissemination to the next-of-kin. Additional information was found on casualties in the U.S. Army's Center for Military History in Washington, DC; the Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA; the Infantry Center Museum at Fort Benning, and the National POW museum in Andersonville, GA. Information gleaned from this research was used to update the 1999 PMKOR database and the field search case data used by CILHI on JROs.

In another collaborative research project, analysts from the RA directorate and CILHI accompanied SPAR archivists to the NPRC and recently found documents including deck logs concerning six USS *Brush* crewmembers who were initially listed as MIA when their destroyer hit a mine on 25 September 1950. The *Brush* was providing offshore gunfire support near Tancheon, Korea. Archival documents at the NPRC indicated

that these six crewmembers were killed in action (remains recovered). These reports were disseminated to the service casualty office for further notification and forwarding to the next of kin.

DPMO researchers have made several attempts to develop an aircraft loss database to account for U.S. aircrew members lost during the Korean War. The initial attempts resulted in separate databases for U.S. Air Force and Navy Department losses. Initially, a DPMO researcher developed a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet that contained the type of aircraft, tail number, unit, and date removed from the inventory. He compiled the database using records from the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, the repository for aircraft assignment records. These were the Air Force gain/loss inventory records, initiated originally by Air Materiel Command. The data were electronically searchable but did not contain any information on the fates of the crewmembers involved.


DPMO researchers also reviewed more than 500 cubic feet of archival records of the U.S. Air Force Headquarters, Far East Air



*Archival acquisitions from Podolsk*

Forces (FEAF) and the Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, located at NARA. These records contain extensive aircraft loss data, casualty data, and operational summaries that provide detailed circumstances of losses of U.S. aircraft and aircrew members.

DPMO researchers next compiled a U.S. Navy Department database, using historical and aircraft loss data from the Navy



***First visit of DPMO researchers to 'Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum in Pyongyang, August 1997'***

and Marine Corps history offices. This 224-page document contained extensive data on approximately 1,200 aircraft losses, including circumstances of loss and the fate of the aircrews.

Another DPMO researcher developed a complete aircraft loss database in 1997–2000. This project entailed finding USAF aircraft loss data at NARA II and at the AFHRA. DPMO researchers also obtained copies of the airfield search cases from CILHI. After an extensive search, a DPMO researcher found the Korean War-era FEAF, FEAF Bomber Command, and Fifth Air Force records at the NPRC. These

records contain extensive aircraft loss and casualty data on Korean War fixed-wing aircraft losses of all services. Two researchers spent two months at the NPRC reviewing these valuable Korean War records. Some of these data are now part of a special collection at the Textual Records Branch, NARA II. The researcher conducted extensive analysis to link specific aircraft losses with the crews and their ultimate fates. The completed database contains 3,200 incidents (approximately 35,000 data fields) with approximately 5,000 crewmembers, including data on Allied aircrews.

The Korean War Aircraft Loss Database contains information on aircraft type and tail number, date of loss, circumstances of loss, status of crew, crash location, and blood chit number, if available, for Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps incidents. The data are cross-referenced to more than 800 hard-copy airfield search case files that contain detailed circumstances of loss of Air Force and Navy Department aircrews. No complete record of Korean War aircraft losses of those services existed before this time. Analysts can electronically search the database and then refer to the hard-copy airfield search case files for details on specific losses. This document will be a significant research tool for analysts, historians, researchers, and academicians.


Of tremendous benefit to the development of information on lost aviators is the USRJC research initiative in the Russian Ministry of Defense Archives at Podolsk, which started in the summer of 1997. Access by U.S. researchers to this material was the result of years of negotiation with the Russian side. Although some documents from Russian archives had been provided previously, the U.S. side did not have access to the archives to conduct independent research. The Russians had for years maintained that they had provided all the information pertinent to Americans that could be found in their

archives. The U.S. side, led by U.S. Representative Sam Johnson (TX), continued to persist. A glimpse of the material was obtained when a television reporter was allowed access in 1994 and videotaped unit photo albums from the 64<sup>th</sup> Fighter Aviation Corps (FAC) units documenting their shootdown claims during the Korean War. The videotape was shown on international television and used to convince the Russians that they did indeed have material that could help account for missing Americans.

The Russians released the first large batch of documents found by U.S. researchers during the 15<sup>th</sup> Plenary Session in 1998. These 6,000 pages of documents and 300 pages of photographs copied from the Podolsk archives had direct relevance to the loss of U.S. aviators and aircraft of all types. All material pertained to the 64<sup>th</sup> FAC, which flew the majority of combat sorties during the war for the Communists. The material contained descriptions of air battles between Soviet and UN air forces, most of which were American. The records often described where aircraft crashed, provided hand-drawn maps with statements from local citizens, and noted whether parachutes were seen or remains found. Some denoted aircraft wreckage photography. The U. S. side believed more archival information from this repository would make it possible to determine the fate of greater numbers of Americans still missing in action.

After receiving the first set of 6,000 pages, the U.S. side has been able to review declassified documents in the archives of the 64<sup>th</sup> FAC and request copies of pertinent material. Transfer of the copies to the United States was erratic at first, requiring high-level Russian government input and complex arrangements. Complicating matters, the Russian side halted all work in the

archives and the release of copied material during the NATO bombing operations in Kosovo in 1999. Continued efforts on the part of the JCSD element in Moscow have now brought this work to a routine state in which U.S. researchers work in the archives eight days monthly and receive copies every month upon payment for services. The more than 14,000 pages of archival documents received to date are being analyzed to clarify the fates of unaccounted-for American servicemen from the war. Some of the documents may be of assistance to CILHI search and recovery teams on the North Korean JROs. Documents are catalogued, reviewed, and analyzed for correlation to specific U.S. missing



***U.S. researchers examine artifacts in the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum in Pyongyang***

servicemen. Those that correlate to a missing serviceman are then translated and provided to the service casualty offices for forwarding to the next of kin and placed in the missing man's case file. For public access, the material is also forwarded to the National Archives, record group 330 I.81, in the original Russian. Those Russian documents that have been

correlated to loss incidences have been translated into English and redacted for public release at NARA and the Library of Congress. By the end of 1999, these data provided information clarifying the circumstances of loss and in some cases the fate of the crew for a total of 139 missing servicemen.

Aside from air loss research in the Russian archives, the U.S. side of the USRJC has opened discussions with a number of officials in Eastern Europe over the past five years. Based on the recognized value of increased cooperation with Eastern European countries on POW/MIA issues, U.S. visits to Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, and Sofia resulted in productive discussions with government officials as well as private citizens sympathetic to the commission's goals and objectives. The dialogue generated a number of archival research and interview programs both to investigate specific allegations and broaden the search for general knowledge these former Communist countries may have had concerning Americans unaccounted for.

Noteworthy among the archival research initiatives in Eastern Europe was an effort by both the Czech government and U.S. researchers to investigate allegations of Korean War prisoner transfers through Czechoslovakia to the former USSR. A former Czechoslovak general officer who had defected in 1968 alleged in sworn testimony to Congress that he knew of medical experiments conducted on U.S. POWs by Czech personnel in Korea as well as their transfer to the former USSR. Acting on a request by the U.S. ambassador to the Czech Republic and later by the urging of the U.S. side of the commission, the Czech Office to Document Crimes of Communism, an office of the Czech Police, investigated the allegations with an eye to criminal prosecution. In the search for evidence, both this Czech office and JCSD conducted research in various Czech archives. Moreover, both elements conducted interviews of persons potentially knowledgeable of the allegations, including surviving members of the Czech medical teams

deployed to North Korea during the war, the staff of the Prague Central Military Hospital, former attaches, and other veterans of the war. Neither investigation produced evidence of Czech involvement with the experimentation or transfer of American POWs.

One of the keys to resolving the cases of unaccounted-for POWs lay with the POW debriefings stored in the Washington area. Starting in 1996, SPAR and RA researchers, augmented by more than 35 reservists, reviewed more than 3,000 Korean War Army POW returnee debriefs at Fort Meade, MD. The debrief team spent more than eight months reviewing an estimated 1.8 million pages. They entered critical accounting data into an extensive DPMO database. In 1999, SPAR archivists reviewed more than 1,250 debriefings, cataloguing and including over 27,000 sighting reports into the database. Researchers also copied more than 18,000 pages of information, including over 12,000 Army Forces Far East Forms 545 (Witness to a POW Death). The information obtained describes loss incidents, POW physical condition, movements, locations after capture, POW camp descriptions, and reports of death with possible burial sites, all of which will contribute directly to development of field search data to aid in future recoveries by CILHI investigators. The database now contains information from more than 3,210 debriefs, with more than 64,000 sighting reports.

DPMO researchers also found more than 100 U.S. Army Korean War POW debriefs in U.S. Department of Justice records. These debriefs are being reviewed for accounting data on missing U.S. personnel and will be incorporated into the database from the Army debriefs at Ft. Meade.

SPAR researchers reviewed a portion of a 10,000-reel collection of microfilmed Soviet gulag and Ministry of Internal Affairs prison system records at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. In addition, researchers obtained a copy of the index to this important collection from the vendor, which will assist in



future research efforts. Additional visits to other domestic universities were also carried out. SPAR archivists visited libraries at the Universities of Texas, Alabama, Hartford, Arizona, and Chicago and at Northwestern, Notre Dame, and DePaul Universities in conjunction with DPMO Family Updates near those locations. An initial electronic catalog search at the University of Texas, the sixth largest university library system in the United States, provided researchers with more than 1,600 leads in numerous languages and noted a Special Collection repository as well. DPMO researchers are scheduled to follow up this initial visit at the University of Texas.

Additional research was also carried out at the Gerald Ford, Lyndon Johnson, Dwight Eisenhower, Harry Truman, James Carter, Richard Nixon, George Bush, and Ronald Reagan presidential libraries. These research facilities contain materials from the collections of the White House, the NSC, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the State Department during the tenure of the associated presidents.

A DPMO researcher discovered copies of the initial Air Force Korean War POW debriefs in the Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence files at NARA II and another set in the Army Surgeon General files at the WNRC. Another dozen or so debriefs were found at the AFHRA. A total of 248 debriefings were found, which contain information pertaining to 233 of the 235 repatriated POWs (3 from Operation Little Switch in April 1953, 217 from Operation Big Switch in August–September 1953, and 13 of the 15 returnees from China released in May and August 1955). These documents, together with the casualty questionnaires to which they refer, provide valuable information on personnel from all services who remain unaccounted for. The repatriated POWs completed casualty questionnaires on other POWs they had encountered in the Communist POW camp system, and the information they contain assists in DPMO's

accounting effort.

During April 1999, SPAR archivists made their third archival trip to Pyongyang, DPRK, visiting the Victorious Fatherland War Museum, the People's Grand Study House, and the Sinchon Museum. As a result of this and prior visits to these facilities, DPMO archivists reviewed and photographed more than 500 documents, photographs, and personal items, including everything from laundry tickets to pay stubs and W-2 statements. Although the visits to these facilities achieved limited results, the information gained proved to be significant. During the third trip the amount of information gained was less than on previous trips, but the archival team did obtain a photograph of an open page from what is believed to be a significant shootdown log of an American aircraft. The F-4U shootdown described correlated with both U.S. records and the commercial memoir of a North Korean aviator who defected to the United States in 1953. Future archival trips are currently being negotiated with the DPRK, and DPMO archivists will press to obtain more information from this log. Also, during the last archival trip the team requested permission to interview the DPRK soldiers, all veterans of the Korean War, who work at the facilities. Permission was not granted, but future teams will pursue this line of research.

SPAR researchers also visited the China University in Hong Kong en route to Pyongyang and determined that there are records in the university's collection that could contain information pertaining to Americans missing from the Korean War. Further research at the Hong Kong university, and other regional universities, is now being pursued.

Although several visits to the American Red Cross Headquarters in Washington, DC, proved unsuccessful, SPAR researchers, while on other duties, traveled to the ICRC Headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, to inquire as to their holdings.

The initial visit indicated that there were significant records available, and two SPAR archivists traveled to Geneva to perform archival research during March of 1998. They obtained 500 pages of documents from the period of the Korean War, which ultimately helped clarify the fate of four individuals listed in the PMKOR database. The relevant documents were provided to the Family Support Directorate and ultimately forwarded to families of the missing. Additionally it was determined that records are available from World War II, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War. Arrangements have been made for additional research at the ICRC in Geneva during 2000.

As a result of contact from an independent researcher, a DPMO archivist, while on vacation, visited the Public Records Office (PRO), at Kew Gardens, in London, England. The PRO is the repository for 900 years of documents including World War II, the Cold War, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Initial information located at the PRO suggests that there are possible archival leads concerning Americans missing from Korea. The information contained in the debriefs of returnee British POWs may provide details pertaining to Americans still missing. Ostensibly there could be information held at the PRO concerning Americans missing from World War II, the Korean War, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War. SPAR's brief visit to this archival facility yielded lists of Americans that correlate to information recorded in Operation Big Switch and Operation Little Switch. The classified records are currently unavailable and could also yield significant information for DPMO. Contact has already been made with the UK Defense Attaché and PRO officials to obtain access to these classified records.

Information from archival research, augmented by the oral history program, and the review of the contents of more than 100 titles in commercial publication have substantially expanded DPMO's base of knowledge on the Korean War. These sources enabled DPMO to develop information on every POW camp and temporary holding point, and their prisoner populations for the entire war. From this research, DPMO analysts have compiled databases for each POW camp cemetery and UN registered cemetery, highly useful information for eventual search and recovery operations. Other research into the early war battles has enabled DPMO to augment the CILHI field search case locational data for the massive engagements with the Chinese in November 1950 in the Chosin, the Chongchon, and the Kuryong River areas. Those data have been key to the development of the search team packets for the joint recovery operations in North Korea.

SPAR archivists continue to visit archives and repositories in the United States and worldwide to obtain information concerning those unaccounted for from World War II, the Cold War, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. They search in any and all locations, ever mindful that our task is to obtain information that is germane to the accounting effort and that will ultimately be provided to the families of those unaccounted- for and the public.

## Chapter 4: Outreach

On 20 March 1999, the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) arranged for a meeting in Sacramento, CA, with the next-of-kin of servicemen still missing from the Vietnam War, the Korean War, and the Cold War. Families were invited from a 300-mile radius, and the service casualty offices collected 137 responses from families living in Northern California. The families of 37 men (24 Army, eight Air Force, and five Navy) still missing from the Korean War attended the event.

The intent of the meeting was to inform the families of the total U.S. government effort to bring home the missing men. Offices of the U.S. government with responsibility in the POW/Missing Personnel issue were present, including DPMO, the Joint Task Force— Full Accounting from the Pacific Forces Command, the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI), the Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory (AFDIL), and the casualty and mortuary offices from each of the services.

These U.S. government offices provided presentations on the U.S. policy of active engagement with the governments of Asian countries and Russia, where U.S.

servicemen were either lost inside of, or close to, the borders. Also mentioned in detail were the ongoing search and recovery programs, the live American POW investigative effort, the worldwide archive research program, and the mitochondria DNA (mtDNA) database. The service casualty offices provided each family member a paper that contained a synopsis on all information known to the Department of Defense (DoD) concerning the circumstances of loss and efforts to recover their missing service member. While this meeting was restricted to family members of unaccounted-for servicemen, the evening before, these same government representatives held briefings for veterans and concerned citizens at the Department of Veterans Affairs offices in downtown Sacramento.

### The Family Update Program

The family and veterans meeting in Sacramento is repeated in a major metropolitan area 11 times each year, including a national meeting held in Washington each June. Every region of the country has been visited since 1995 at least once, and DPMO has hosted a total of 63 meetings through October 2000. Larger

metropolitan areas such as: New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Dallas-Fort Worth, Houston, Seattle, and Denver; as well as smaller cities such as: Albuquerque, Pensacola, Rochester, Hartford, Canton, and Bangor, have been chosen as venues.

The Sacramento meeting had the largest number of Korean War cases represented by family member participants up to that time. This outreach program is a highly beneficial initiative for getting the message out on POW/Missing Personnel issues and has interest even at the National Security Council level. Feedback is



***Special Assistant for Family Support Dr. Kaye Whitley informs families and veterans of current DoD accounting efforts***

overwhelmingly positive, and for some families, it is the first contact from the government in nearly 50 years. Each program includes time for families to personally discuss their case with DPMO, Joint Task Force—Full Accounting, and service casualty experts. These sessions have dual benefit, as some families have provided information to DoD that survived from lost records germane to the case file of the unaccounted for.

One of the extraordinary veterans outreach initiatives undertaken by DPMO was the submission of a request for special recognition for bravery of a returned POW. DPMO in 1996 submitted through U.S. Army channels a request for the Silver Star Medal to former Korean War POW Sergeant Wayne “Johnny” Johnson, who had risked his life by compiling and concealing from Chinese guards a list of 459 POWs who died mostly in the early stages of the war. His effort contributed in a large measure to the Far East Command and the service staffs’ efforts to account for POWs who never returned. In the summer of 1996 the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis Reimer, awarded Johnson the medal. Publicity from this event and a subsequent *Reader’s Digest* article by Malcolm McConnell resulted in contact with hundreds of next of kin of MIA that the services had not heard from in 44 years.

## **Accessing Information on POWs/ Missing Personnel**

DPMO has cultivated other avenues to pass along information through public affairs channels, senior officer speeches at veterans’ conventions, periodic news releases, and a Web site. The news releases, special research reports, and databases such as the Personnel Missing Korea List and the Air Loss Database are on the Web site.

Aggressive research and response to congressional questions and family, concerned citizen, and veterans’ telephone calls and

written requests for information further aid the effort. For the Korean War, DPMO researches and answers about 250 inquiries per year. In one such request for records on a lost B-26 aviator, DPMO discovered that the unaccounted-for serviceman’s file had been destroyed in the 1973 National Personnel Records Center fire at St. Louis. Still, by compiling the records of the other missing men from the crew from that facility and other locations, DPMO was able to provide reconstructed records on the lost aviator to the next of kin. Moreover, because of the establishment of an international archives network on POW/MIA issues, DPMO, per the family request, was able to facilitate contact between the same next of kin and British former POW offices.

The Missing Persons Act (Title 10, United States Code, Sections 1501-1513), passed by Congress in 1996, drove much of the outreach effort, as it directed information from any source discovered on specific unaccounted-for individuals to be passed to the next of kin. Pursuant to this law, and the DoD Instruction that implements it (DoDI 2310.5), the service casualty offices have worked actively to locate the next of kin of missing servicemen so that information discovered from various search endeavors can be forwarded to them. Support also comes from veteran service organizations (VSOs), which pass along information on the addresses of known next of kin.

Other government agencies responsible for record keeping have facilitated the acquisition and sharing of POW/Missing Personnel information. In the early 1990s, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) organized the Korean War POW/Missing Personnel holdings by various service, agency, major historical event, and media categories. In 1997, NARA published the handbook *Records Relating to American Prisoners of War and Missing-in-Action Personnel from the Korean War and During the Cold War era*. In accordance with the McCain bill and the

Missing Persons Act, information that may pertain to the treatment, location, or condition of United States personnel who remain not accounted-for as a result of service in the Korean War is sent to NARA not later than one year after it is received. NARA indexes these and other government files retired after 50 years for public access. Much of the material is accessible using their online system. Material can also be accessed by calling ahead for specific files to be pulled for reading room appointments. Some translations of Russian archival material on the Korean War and unaccounted-for servicemen has also been scanned and sent to the Library of Congress for posting on its Web site at <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/tfrquery.html>.

An executive order (EO) affecting Korean War-era documents was signed by President Clinton in April 1995 (EO 12958). This order, while addressing a variety of information security and declassification issues, includes a provision to declassify documents 25 years old and older, which would include documents from the Korean War. Automatic declassification called for under the EO does not pertain under certain narrowly defined conditions such as intelligence sources and methods, information acquired from foreign governments, statutory protections, and continuing security programs. Nevertheless, most documents originated by DoD pertaining to the Korean War can be declassified because they contain information that no longer requires continued protection.

Declassification of Korean War documents is a coordinated effort of NARA, its presidential libraries, and other archives, and the document originators. Therefore, the Korean War document declassification effort is largely borne by the services, intelligence agencies, and the Department of State. DPMO alone does not have the authority to conduct this declassification; nevertheless, the position of the organization is for the broadest possible release of Korean War documents. Many

thousands of documents have been automatically declassified and are in custodial possession of NARA and affiliated presidential libraries.

While most information related to Korean War missing servicemen is open to the public, privacy considerations for the next of kin do preclude some public access. In order to maintain a level of privacy that may be desired by a family, the McCain bill was made retroactive to the Korean War in 1993. Statutory provisions such as the McCain bill and the Privacy Act take precedence over executive orders when there are apparent conflicts in these directives. Service casualty offices and DPMO since 1996 have maintained records of families who have taken the option not to allow information on treatment, location, or condition of a POW/MIA to be released to third parties.

## **Family Member Organizations and Veterans Service Organization Roles**

Family members and VSOs are direct participants in the U.S. government strategy to impress upon foreign governments the importance of the POW/Missing Personnel issue. DPMO has arranged delegations of these constituencies to visit North Korea on two occasions in 1997 and 1998. Organizations represented were Korean and Cold War families of the POW/MIA, Coalition of Korean and Cold War Families of POW/MIA, Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Chosin Few and the Korean War Veterans Association. A meeting was also arranged with DPRK representatives during the December 1998 DPMO and DPRK talks in New York. The delegations met with the KPA and MFA officials that DPMO deals with routinely and made the argument for accounting from a family and veterans perspective. They also visited the remote excavation sites in northwest DPRK on these trips. DPMO on their behalf has been brokering for a like visit to Beijing since January 1999.

These organizations routinely correspond in writing with the governments of the Korean War adversaries to express the desires of their membership. Such correspondence helps to reinforce U.S. government positions on POW/Missing Personnel issues such as the compensation and the repatriation issues mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2.


### **MtDNA Database**

Because of the development of DNA technology since 1985, families are now direct partners in the identification process. The development of the Family Reference Sample database of maternal relatives of the 8,171 men still missing from the Korean War will greatly enhance the ability to use mtDNA in

the identification process. Since 1993, the military departments have attempted to obtain maternal family reference samples for the database of the AFDIL on mtDNA. The service casualty offices have instituted an outreach program that has made great strides in contacting family members from the Korean War missing. As of May 2000, Korean War next of kin had contributed 1,686 mtDNA samples to ADFIL. CILHI used mtDNA to support the identifications of 40 percent of its total worldwide cases.

The service casualty offices have streamlined the process for blood sample contribution by sending out individual kits to families. Some services also by 2000 had integrated phlebotomy services, whose technicians now travel to the family's home and take a blood sample for the DNA sequence.

**Pie chart denotes the Korean War next-of-kin portion (1686 samples) of the total Family Reference Sample Database**





## Chapter 5: The Commitment

**I**t was evident from the first ceasefire negotiation sessions at Kaesong in 1951 that the U.S. government intended to get an accounting for the men still lost from the Korean War. Numerous segments of the government have pursued the issue during and since the end of the war. This goal has been clearly enunciated in U.S. government words and actions.

analysts will continue to develop information on unidentified remains in the Punchbowl so that more disinterments can be made on our own soil. The ambitious recovery schedule and resulting laboratory workload requirement is backed by 1996 and 1999 through 2004 increase in manpower strength. The increases were recommended by the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency so that CILHI could execute the Korea recovery



*Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, Arlington National Cemetery*

DoD has followed up the Secretary of Defense Perry Proclamation of May 1996 with an ambitious program of remains recoveries in North Korea, making over 90 recoveries since that year. The DPMO Strategic Plan for Korea calls for continued multiple JROs into country from 2001 forward. Back in the U.S., CILHI and DPMO

missions as well as the other worldwide commitments. The Korean War 50 Year Commemoration has given cause for additional recoveries in South Korea as well.

DPMO is continuing to work on the live prisoner issue—in every forum with Korean War adversaries DPMO policy makers are pressing the



DPRK delegations to allow access to U.S. Army deserters to North Korea from the 1960s. These men might be of assistance in resolving some of the sightings. DPMO will continue to broker the North Koreans for information on defector reports of Korean War era Americans left behind. The goal is to be able to get access on the ground in North Korea and thoroughly investigate every unresolved sighting.

Other elements in the DoD scientific community aside from CILHI are ready to support the accounting effort. AFDIL, at the forefront of the DNA technology, will continue to build the Korean War database from its current 1686 samples. The San Antonio TX, Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory (LSEL) has conducted considerable case work for DoD on Southeast Asia unaccounted for cases. The laboratory has gradually built a set of Korean War era equipment samples and technical manuals for comparison purposes for the support of the Korea mission when needed.

The search for information that will lead DoD to the whereabouts of these missing men is a worldwide search. Numerous military archives, National Archives centers, as well as academic libraries and private collections in museums around the country present a continuous challenge in covering in a systematic and timely manner. Archives of former adversaries in North Korea and China remain largely out of reach now, but access is only a matter of time with the maturing of the relationship with those countries, with respect to the Korean War. While U.S. researchers may realistically not expect to get access to GRU and KGB archives, the Russian Air Force records at Podolsk remain open and have provided new information on 130 lost aviators. Additionally, the Eastern European repositories in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria, as well as the archives of the former East Germany hold promise for continued research. Over 450 total worldwide archive collections have been identified with potential for Korean War materials germane to the issue.

The search for witnesses continues as well. The 1000 U.S. Korean War veteran interviews have provided information from foxhole deaths to POW camp cemetery burials. Russian military veterans from the war have also been forthcoming. Initiatives set up in 1999 and 2000 on expanding the oral history program populations' hold the promise for access to heretofore-untapped sources of information. These sources will include ROK veterans who fought side by side with U.S. soldiers throughout the war. Our Chinese Korean War adversaries, through the PRC's office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have begun to allow access to their veterans as well.

While considerable research remains to be done to develop more information on our unaccounted for servicemen, DPMO and other researchers acting on its behalf in the 1990s have built a tremendous knowledge base on this issue through investigative efforts. The determination of the realm of all possible unaccounted for from the war is being achieved with the Personnel Missing Korea List; an 8171 name list derived from three different U.S. government listings. This dynamic document continues to improve with research by DoD with input from the public. A separate listing of 3200 all-service aviation incidents was created as well.

In an effort to reexamine POW populations that could have been held back during or after the war, DPMO researchers are finding that the vast majority of POWs who did not return simply died in the camps and on the death march routes. The research into this matter included review of every prison camp and POW holding point; it encompassed the review of archived debriefings and rescreening of surviving veterans. The Rand Study of 1993 came to the same conclusion that unaccounted for populations were not large enough for train loads of many hundreds of men to be housed or held back in China or sent to third countries. DPMO researchers further noted that hundreds of the wartime MIAs presumed dead after the

war for the lack of witnesses, were likely killed in their loss incidents.

While the U.S. side of the USRJC believes that there is a high probability that a small number of men, such as aviators for technology exploitation purposes, were transferred to the Soviet Union, investigation continues to develop that position and identify possible individuals.

Two years after the signing of the Armistice Agreement, President Eisenhower at a ceremony announcing the revised Code of Conduct, stated, **“No American prisoner of war will be forgotten by the United States. Every available means will be employed by our Government to establish contact with, to support, and to obtain release of all our prisoners of war.”** And these men have not been forgotten. It is a fitting tribute that those men still unaccounted for and their families are to receive special recognition during the three-year period of the 50<sup>th</sup> Commemoration of the Korean War. Indeed, at the 25 June 2000 Commemoration kickoff, which took place at the Korean War Memorial, President Clinton announced the identification of two more servicemen, Sergeant Hallie A. Clark, Jr., and Corporal James T. Higgins. Their remains had been recovered during Joint U.S. and North Korean recovery operations in 1998 and 1999. He further recognized their next of kin, who were in attendance.

The search continues. Within ten days of the 25 June commemoration, a CILHI team operating in North Pyonggan Province, North Korea, began the recovery of 12 more U.S. servicemen missing since November 1950. At the conclusion of this recovery operation, these men were repatriated with full UNC and USPACOM military honors in Yakota, Japan and later at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii respectively.



*Korean War remains repatriation at Hickam AFB, Hawaii*





## Glossary of Terms

|       |  |
|-------|--|
| AFDIL | Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory       |
| ABMC  | American Battle Monuments Commission             |
| AFHRA | Air Force Historical Research Agency             |
| CILHI | Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii        |
| CMAOC | Casualty and Mortuary Affairs Operations Center  |
| CPV   | Chinese People's Volunteers                      |
| DASD  | Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense            |
| DIOR  | Directorate of Operations and Reports            |
| DMZ   | Demilitarized Zone                               |
| DoD   | Department of Defense                            |
| DPMO  | Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office |
| DPRK  | Democratic People's Republic of Korea            |
| EO    | Executive Order                                  |
| FAC   | Fighter Aviation Corps                           |
| FEAF  | Far East Air Forces                              |
| ICRC  | International Committee of the Red Cross         |
| JCS   | Joint Chiefs of Staff                            |
| JCSD  | Joint Commission Support Directorate             |
| JRO   | Joint Recovery Operation                         |
| KPA   | Korean People's Army                             |
| MAC   | Military Armistice Commission                    |
| MFA   | Ministry of Foreign Affairs                      |
| MIA   | Missing in Action                                |

|         |   |
|---------|---|
| MND     | Ministry of National Defense (Republic of Korea)        |
| MtDNA   | Mitochondria DNA  |
| NARA    | National Archives and Records Administration            |
| NARA II | National Archives, College Park, MD                     |
| NPRC    | National Personnel Records Center                       |
| NSC     | National Security Council                               |
| PACOM   | U.S. Pacific Command                                    |
| PMKOR   | Personnel Missing Korea List                            |
| POW     | Prisoner of War   |
| PRC     | People's Republic of China                              |
| PRO     | Public Records Office (United Kingdom)                  |
| RA      | Research and Analysis (directorate)                     |
| RECAP-K | Returned or Exchanged Captured American Personnel-Korea |
| ROK     | Republic of Korea                                       |
| SPAR    | Special Projects and Archival Research Directorate      |
| VSO     | Veterans Service Organization                           |
| UNCMAC  | United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission    |
| USFK    | U.S. Forces Korea                                       |
| USRJC   | U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs         |
| USSR    | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics                     |
| WNRC    | Washington National Records Center                      |



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